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Charitable Pledges: Contracts of Confusion
William A. Drennan*
Abstract
With postmortem enlightenment, Jacob Marley's ghost sternly
forewarns Ebenezer Scrooge to embrace the "business of charity," which
Marley's ghost associates with mercy, forbearance, and benevolence.
This Article analyzes an aspect of the business of charity tainted with
stealth bordering on trickery, mandatory ingratitude, and judicial contriv-
ances. This Article seeks to make two contributions to the important de-
bate about the enforceability of charitable pledges. First, new empirical
evidence developed for this Article indicates approximately 95 percent of
charities fail to disclose in their pledge forms that the donor will be legal-
ly bound to make all the pledge payments. Despite the absence of an
agreement o be bound, consideration, or substantial detrimental reliance,
courts almost always enforce charitable pledges. Second, this Article
proposes reforming this sullied aspect of the business of charity with a
new, workable approach focusing on traditional contract rules, basic
promissory estoppel doctrine, and the donor's intent.
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"The law of charitable [pledging] has been a prolific source of con-
fusion. ",
Imagine that Transparency-Challenged Charity ("T.C. Charity")
provided its donors with a multi-year pledge2 form that fails to state
whether the pledge is legally binding. New empirical evidence devel-
1. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l. Chautauqua Cty. Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173,
174 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, C.J.).
2. A charitable pledge, also called a charitable subscription, is a donor's written or
oral promise or statement of intent to contribute money or property to a charity over a
period of time, frequently three or five years. See King v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 647
N.E.2d 1196, 1199 n.3 (Mass. 1995) (the words "pledge" and "subscription" often are
used interchangeably). The empirical evidence created for this Article indicates that
standard pledge forms usually are silent regarding enforceability. See infra Part II.A. A
pledge form could state that it is legally binding, see infra notes 108-110, 97-99 and ac-
companying text, or it could state that the donor can revoke the pledge at any time. See
Rubin M.W. Trozpek, Pledges: Good Understandings Make Good Gifts, CONF. PRESEN-
TATION PAPER (Nat'l Conf. on Philanthropic Plan., Orlando, Fla.), Oct. 13-15, 2010, at 4,
12, http://bit.ly/1VnZB5R.
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oped for this Article indicates this occurs 95 percent of the time.3 If
Generous Giver ("Generous") signs the pledge form and makes the first
pledge payment, in which of the following situations will Generous be
legally obligated to make all of the scheduled pledge payments?
a. Investigative reports reveal that T.C. Charity officials have been
billing the charity to fund their outrageously extravagant lifestyles.
4
Generous, who has supported T.C. Charity for years, feels betrayed,
stops funding T.C. Charity, and begins supporting a different charity.
b. T.C. Charity owns and operates a hospital, and a new survey re-
veals that it provides a disturbingly small amount of charity care for
the poor and aggressively tries to collect its fees from low-income in-
dividuals.5 Generous is disappointed and would prefer to support a
more merciful hospital.
c. T.C. Charity owns and operates a high school, and when Generous
signed the pledge the high school was in an area accessible for inner-
city youths. T.C. Charity subsequently relocates the entire high
school campus to an affluent suburb miles away.6 Generous would
prefer to support a high school accessible to inner-city youth rather
than supporting a high school catering to wealthy families.
d. T.C. Charity owns and operates an all-female college, and Gener-
ous made the pledge because the school did a fine job educating her
eldest daughter. News reports recently reveal that many all-female
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See, e.g., Matthew Barakat, Disgraced Former CEO of United Way, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at 37, 2011 WLNR 23518488 ("William Aramony... spent the
charity's money to fund a lavish lifestyle, including gifts and trips for a 17-year old girl-
friend [when he was 60 years old and married]."); Anne Flaherty, Associated Press, FTC:
Family Raised $187M for Cancer, Spent It on Themselves, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH
(MO), May 20, 2015, at Al, 2015 WLNR 14933562 ("his family... [bought] themselves
cars, gym memberships and [took] luxury cruise vacations ... in one of the largest chari-
ty fraud cases ever, involving all 50 states").
5. See, e.g., Ralph Loos, Exemption Inquiry: Congress Not Sure What Sets Apart
Not-for-profits, 35 MOD. HEALTHCARE 8 (2005), 2005 WLNR 28777879 ("The [2003]
reports [from consumer groups and the media] suggested hospitals were charging 'list
prices' to the uninsured and were using aggressive collection tactics against low-income
patients and were not providing enough charity care."); Melissa Block, Profile: Long Is-
land Hospital Survey Finds Lack of Patient Access to Charity Care, NPR ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED, July 25, 2003, 2003 WLNR 16702605.
6. See, e.g., Editorial, A School Moves West, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (MO),
Nov. 13, 1998, at C16, 1998 WLNR 891888 ("With its move a connection between the
school's students and the region's historical center is loosened. .. sprawl and flight from
the urban center affects not just the City .... "); Dale Singer, CBC Agonizes Over Im-
pending Move: Board Is Expected to Approve It, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (MO), Nov.
1, 1998, at Cl, 1998 WLNR 891595.
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colleges are welcoming transgender individuals7 but T.C. Charity is
not among them. Generous stops contributing to T.C. Charity and in-
stead makes an identical pledge to support a more inclusive college.
e. Generous made the pledge when her youngest daughter was at-
tending the local high school owned and operated by T.C. Charity.
Subsequently, Generous' job requires that she and her family relo-
cate. Her daughter now attends a different high school, and Generous
would prefer to donate to her daughter's new high school.
8
f. T.C. Charity's mission is to feed the poor, but a new survey re-
veals that T.C. Charity incurs significantly higher administrative and
other overhead costs compared to other charities performing the same
function. Generous would prefer that her donations support a charity
providing greater benefits to the poor.
g. T.C. Charity conducts medical research on a disease, and Gener-
ous made the pledge when she was still grieying the death of her
mother from that disease. Now, Generous realizes he would prefer
to support a different charitable mission.
The vast majority of U.S. courts would conclude that Generous
Giver is legally obligated to pay all future donations under the pledge
form despite T.C. Charity's failure to disclose that the pledge is legally
binding.9 Furthermore, T.C. Charity's board of directors likely has a fi-
duciary duty to sue Generous in court for any missed payments.10
7. See, e.g., Ari Nussbaum, Women's Colleges Adopt Transgender Admission Pol-
icies, Others Continue to Rally, THE CAMPANIL (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.thecampanil.com/womens-colleges-adopt-transgender-admissions-policies-
others-continue-to-rally/ (reporting that "students at some women's colleges are still
fighting for change"); Elizabeth A. Harris, Barnard College Will Soon Accept
Transgender Women, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 2015, 2015 WLNR 16629648.
8. See Woodmere Academy v. Steinberg, 363 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (N.Y. 1977),
affg 385 N.Y.S.2d 549 (App. Div. 1976) (providing an example where the donor's child
changed schools after the donor signed the pledge form, and the donor contributed to a
different charity after the move).
9. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS 225 (6th ed. 2009) ("With great frequency, but not with complete uniformi-
ty, charitable subscriptions have been enforced in [the U.S.]."); Mary Francis Budig,
Gordon T. Butler & Lynne M. Murphy, Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations: Are They
Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced? 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 49-50, 53 n.3 (1992)
(stating that since 1817 over 300 cases have considered the issue, and "[tlhe result [gen-
erally] has been the enforcement of charitable subscriptions .... "); PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NONPROFIT ORG. § 490, cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009)
[hereinafter ALl DRAFT PRINCIPLES] (providing that "ordinary disagreements over charity
management would not give rise to a defense for a suit on a binding pledge").
10. See Budig, et al., supra note 9, at 50 ("[D]uties currently imposed on nonprofit
directors will in many circumstances mandate them to enforce charitable pledges."); see
also ALl DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 490, cmt. a (providing that an attorney gen-
[Vol. 120:2
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A U.S. court likely will enforce Generous' pledge to T.C. Charity
under one or more of the following twisted" legal theories:
" It is a binding bilateral contract supported by consideration be-
cause under its articles of incorporation the charity must use all
funds received for charitable purposes.
12
" It is a binding bilateral contract because other donors pledged.3
" It is a binding unilateral contract because T.C. Charity actually
used Generous' initial donation for charitable purposes. 14
* It is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel be-
cause T.C. Charity substantially relied to its detriment on the
pledge. '
• It is enforceable under a modified promissory estoppel theory
approach in § 90 of the Restatement Second of Contracts, re-
gardless of whether T.C. Charity relied on the pledge.16
This is an unfortunate result in many respects. Generous likely
feels duped. The pledge form failed to honestly disclose that Generous
was legally obligated, circumstances changed, and she chose to support a
different charity. At the same time, T.C. Charity's governing body may
feel like ingrates when suing someone who made an initial contribution
and subsequently preferred not to donate because of changed circum-
stances. And courts frequently complain about having to apply the artifi-
cially contrived legal rules of charitable pledging which defy logic,
17
common sense, and fundamental principles of common law. 8
This practice of U.S. courts enforcing almost all charitable pledges
likely encourages charities to use laconic pledge forms that mislead do-
eral will not sue to enforce a pledge, but an attorney general might sue the charity's gov-
erning board for breach of their fiduciary duties).
11. See infra Part I.B. (arguing that the normal application of these doctrines has
been twisted); Dalhousie Coll. at Halifax v. Boutilier Estate, 1934 CarswellNS 43, [1934]
S.C.R. 642, 3 D.L.R. 593 (Can. 1934) (WL) (stating that U.S. cases enforcing charitable
pledges are "unsound in principle," the arguments for enforcement have "no basis in
fact," and are "inconsistent with elementary principles").
12. See infra notes 63-66.
13. See infra notes 71-73.
14. See infra notes 79-81.
15. See infra notes 90-91.
16. See infra notes 97-103.
17. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 271-72 (5th ed.
2011) (observing that English courts take a "strictly logical view" and conclude that char-
itable pledges are gratuitous and therefore unenforceable).
18. See, e.g., Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So.2d 484, 487 (Fla. 1974) ("To
ascribe consideration where there is none, or to adopt any other theory which affords
charities a different legal rationale than other entities, is to approve fiction."); see also
infra Part I.B.
20151
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nors.19 This Article demonstrates the prevalence of this problem with
new empirical research indicating that approximately 95 percent of
standard charitable pledge forms fail to clearly state whether the pledge
is legally binding, and 85 percent fail to provide even a clue about
whether the pledge is binding.0
The current U.S. approach disregards the donor's intent. This Arti-
cle proposes a new approach that will enforce a charitable pledge only if:
(i) it would be binding under noncharitable l gal principles normally ap-
plied, specifically under contract law or the promissory estoppel doc-
trine; or (ii) the donor manifested an intent that the pledge would be le-
gally enforceable by clear and convincing evidence.
Part I of this Article traces the legal fictions U.S. courts often use to
enforce charitable pledges, including standard21 charitable pledges. This
discussion will demonstrate that a donor could reasonably believe that a
standard pledge to make future charitable gifts would not be enforceable
either as a matter of common sense or based upon an understanding of
basic legal principles. Indeed, English common law and a handful of
U.S. cases refuse to enforce standard charitable pledges for persuasive
reasons.
22
Part II describes new empirical evidence created for this Article that
indicates approximately 95 percent of standard charitable pledge forms
are sneaky; they fail to disclose that the charitable pledge is legally bind-
ing like a debt.
Part III proposes a new two-prong test for enforcing charitable
pledges. Under the first prong, charitable pledges would be enforceable
under normal legal rules. In the modem era of fundraising, normal con-
tract analysis may enforce most significant dollar pledges because the
donor receives valuable charitable naming rights.23 When a transaction
involves a part-bargain (such as a naming right) and a part-gift, tradition-
al contract analysis finds sufficient consideration to enforce the entire
transaction.24 In addition, normal promissory estoppel doctrine could en-
force other significant dollar pledges when the donor knew or should
have known the charity was relying on the pledge in beginning construc-
19. See infra Part ll.B.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. In this Article, a "standard" charitable pledge is a pledge arrangement in which
(i) the charity and the donor did not negotiate the details of the pledge, and (ii) the
amount of the pledge is not material compared to the charity's overall fundraising activi-
ties. As discussed in Part III.A infra, negotiated and material pledges can be enforceable
in many situations under normal legal principles without regard to any special rules for
charities.
22. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part III.A.1.
24. See infra notes 177-185 and accompanying text.
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tion on a project or in other ways.25 The second prong proposes a change
in the law that would enforce other charitable pledges when there is clear
and convincing evidence that the donor intended the pledge to be legally
binding.
Part IV concludes that this Article's proposal would encourage
charitable fundraisers to honestly disclose legal enforceability and reduce
the current economic incentive to deceive donors. Additionally, this
proposal will free charity's directors from suing donors who can realisti-
cally claim they were misled26 and will eliminate artificial judicial con-
coctions27 imposing liabilities on donors with bona fide claims of decep-
tion.
I. SURPRISE: CURRENT RULES CONTRARY TO REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS
A. Common Sense Confounded. Promise of a Gift Treated as a Debt
I promise to attend your party Saturday night.28 I promise to take
out the trash every day. "If it rains tomorrow I will pay you $10 .
'o29
Does the law always require everyone to do what they say they will do?
The answer has been an emphatic "no" even for written promises.30 "No
legal system enforces all promises ... the coercive power of the State
will not ... [penalize] ... the defaulting promisor unless the law deems
25. See infra notes 90-9t and accompanying text.
26. A draft of an ALI Principles document also focuses on this problem and consid-
ers the parties' intent in deciding if a charity's directors have a duty to sue to enforce the
pledge. Unfortunately, in the ALI draft, the donor's intent to be bound is presumed in
various circumstances including (i) at all times after the donor has made the initial dona-
tion, or (ii) if the charity relied to its detriment on the pledge, or (iii) if the pledge induced
others to give to the charity. ALl Draft Principles, supra note 9, at § 490(c), quoted in
CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, AND HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW 227 (7th ed. 2012). This Article's proposal rejects those presumptions
for various reasons. See Part III.C infra (considering the ALI draft in more detail).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(setting forth the American Law Institute's attempt to create a rule that would allow
courts to enforce charitable pledges without the need to twist traditional contract rules);
see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing the ALl proposals).
28. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 26-27 (concluding there would be no breach of
contract cause of action if the promisor partied elsewhere "because it is a reasonable fac-
tual presumption that the parties intended that only a social obligation should result. The
inference is that the parties did not intend legal consequences").
29. Id. at 156.
30. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 533 (stating that courts have "widen[ed] .. . the
grounds for avoiding enforcement of an agreement" based on the competency of the par-
ties, the bargaining process in reaching the agreement, and the substance of the agree-
ment); see, e.g., Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 95 (N.Y. 1919) (refusing to enforce a
promise even though it was evidenced by a signed promissory note).
2015]
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the enforcement of the promise socially useful. '31 Despite the general
recognition of the duty to read,32 courts often refuse to enforce written
33promises for various reasons.
Most relevant for this discussion is the question of whether to en-
force promises to make future gifts. Several practical and persuasive ar-
guments support the view that promises to make future gifts to family
members, friends, and other persons should not be enforced. Often these
promises are made in a highly emotional state or other transient mindset,
and the recipient is, or should be, fully aware that the donor may recon-
sider upon returning to a more tranquil mood. Professor Eisenberg ob-
serves that it would be unfair to sue the promisor for over-enthusiasm at
a time of stress, gratitude, or affection.34 In some situations, a person
might promise a gift in haste to impress others.35 Other reasons why the
promisor should be entitled to renege include the promisee subsequently
demonstrating ingratitude.36  Also, these promises frequently are made
informally, and it may be too easy for a plaintiff to convince a jury, false-
ly, that a defendant promised to give.37 Furthermore, in the case of gifts,
"there are no significant costs on the part of the promisee and no enrich-
ment on the part of the promisor at the expense of the promisee.'38
31. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 149.
32. See id. at 342 (asserting that a party who signs "may not later complain about not
reading or not understanding"); see, e.g., Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d
272, 278 (Md. 1952) ("One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who mani-
fests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to be an
offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the
writing or of its proper interpretation." (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70
(AM. LAW INST. 1932))).
33. For example, courts refuse to enforce promises in cases involving misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, economic duress, undue influence, and in other situations when enforcement
would be inappropriate. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 273 (economic duress), 286 (un-
due influence), 292 (misrepresentation), 331 (unconscionability); see also KNAPP ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 533. Also, courts refuse to enforce promises when there simply has
been no "meeting of the minds." PERILLO, supra note 9, at 23 ("Usually, an essential
prerequisite to the formation of a contract is an agreement-a mutual manifestation of
assent o the same terms.").
34. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979)
(remarking that the promisee should not have a "secure expectation" because the promi-
see should "realize[] the promisor may back off when a sober self returns"); see also
Budig et al., supra note 9, at 59 ("Charitable solicitations are often charged with high
emotions.").
35. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 102.
36. Id. at 115 (providing an example of an uncle who "promises to give [his]
[n]ephew $20,000 in two years, and [the] [n]ephew... wrecks [the] [u]ncle's living room
in an angry rage"); see also Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 5 (same hypothetical).
37. Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 4-5.
38. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 149.
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Courts generally use the doctrine of consideration to refuse to en-
force a promise to make a future gift.39 The law will enforce a promise
as a contract only if it is supported by consideration.° Consideration is a
return benefit or detriment,41 which was bargained for, and induced the
promise.42 In order to qualify a promise as an enforceable contract sup-
ported by consideration, the other party needs to promise to provide (or
actually provide) a return benefit or legal detriment, and the original
promisor must have bargained for that return benefit or detriment.43
The classic case of Dougherty v. Salt" demonstrates the failure of
consideration in future gift situations. In Dougherty, an aunt says she in-
tends "to take care of' her eight-year-old nephew because he is "a nice
boy.,45 The nephew's guardian basically asks whether the aunt is merely
making an empty promise or is willing to put her money where her
mouth is.46 The aunt responds by signing a formal promissory note,
which provides for a payment of $3,000 to her nephew during her life or
at her death, and the aunt delivers the promissory note to the nephew say-
ing, "I have signed this note for you. Now, do not lose it. Someday it
will be valuable.47 After the aunt's death, when the nephew sues to col-
lect on the promissory note, Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority,
concluded that "the note was the voluntary and unenforceable promise of
an executory gift. ' 48 Cardozo stated there was no evidence that the neph-
ew provided a benefit to his aunt or that the nephew suffered a legal det-
riment.49 The court also failed to find that the aunt bargained for any-
thing or that her promise was induced by consideration from the
nephew.50 In concluding that the aunt's estate need not pay the $3,000
39. Id. ("[A]n informal, unrelied-on gratuitous promise generally will not be en-
forced."). But see infra notes 281-292 and accompanying text (describing how a promise
to make a future gift may be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel).
40. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 150 ("[T]he common law usually requires that
promises be made for a consideration if they are to be binding."). But see id. at 149
("[D]onative promise[s] ... may be enforced under... promissory estoppel.").
41. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891) (describing consideration
as a benefit to one party or a detriment suffered by the other party).
42. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 152-53.
43. See Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257 (enforcing an uncle's promise to pay his nephew
$5,000 if the nephew "refrain[ed] from drinking liquor, using tobacco, swearing, and
playing cards or billiards for money until he [attained] twenty-one years of age"); see al-
so KNAPP ET AL., supra 26, at 109 (stating that "each party's promise and resulting per-
formance [must] induce [] the corresponding promise and performance by the other par-
ty").
44. See Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919).
45. Id. at 94.
46. Id.
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promised, Justice Cardozo stated, "Nothing is consideration that is not
regarded as such by both parties."51
If a person-to-person written promise of a future gift is unenforcea-
ble, common sense suggests that similar donor-to-charity promises
should be unenforceable.52 One article bluntly states, "In a typical chari-
table pledge, conventional consideration is absent because the charity
suffers no detriment and the promisor seeks no benefit.' 53 Other com-
mentators claim, "If the bargain theory of consideration has as a principal
function distinguishing [enforceable] exchanges from [nonenforceable]
gifts ... then obviously charitable gifts will generally fall on the nonen-
forceable side of the line."
54
English common law55 and a handful of U.S. cases56 reflect this log-
ical view that charitable gifts are unenforceable for lack of consideration
and refuse to enforce standard charitable pledges. For example, in Dal-
housie College v. Boutilier Estate,57 in connection with a fund drive, Ar-
thur Boutilier signed a pledge to donate $5,000 "in consideration of the
[promises] of others."58 The Canadian Supreme Court rejected several
arguments by Dalhousie College and declared the pledge unenforcea-
ble.5 9 Despite noting that American courts likely would enforce the
pledge, the Canadian Supreme Court said that "without any deference to
eminent judges who have held otherwise" we view Dalhousie College's
position as "an attempt to turn a charity into something very different
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. See WILLIAM STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER
SEAL § 453 (2d ed. 1847), quoted in Budig et al., supra note 9, at 51-52.
53. Budig et al., supra note 9, at 51. If the charity provided a private benefit to the
donor, the arrangement could jeopardize the charity's tax-exempt status under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2013); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2)
(1959) (stating that an organization will not qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3) if its earnings
inure to the benefit of a private individual).
54. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 218.
55. See In re Hudson, 54 L.J. Ch. 811, 814 (1885), cited with approval in PERILLO,
supra note 9, at 225 n.32 (stating that unsealed charitable subscriptions generally are not
enforced in England).
56. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 545 A.2d 674,
685 (Md. 1988) (rejecting a claimed estate tax deduction because under Maryland law a
charitable pledge must be supported by consideration); Congregation Kadimah Toras-
Moshe v. De Leo, 540 N.E.2d 691, 693-94 (Mass. 1989) (refusing to enforce oral pledge
after donor's death); Md. Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, Inc., 407 A.2d
1130, 1136 (Md. 1979) (concluding that there was no consideration, no detrimental reli-
ance, and that "settled principles" should not be disregarded); Dillard Univ. v. Int'l Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 169 So. 2d 221, 224 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (finding there was no meet-
ing of the minds because the pledge was a mere publicity "gimmick"); Mt. Sinai Hosp.,
Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484, 486-87 (Fla. 1974).
57. Dalhousie Coll. At Halifax v. Boutilier Estate, 1934 CarswellINS 43, [1934]
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from a charity [and] ... it ought to fail, and. . . it does fail. 6° Presuma-
bly, the Canadian Supreme Court was implying that the charitable col-
lege was attempting to turn itself into a creditor enforcing a debt.
Thus, if a reasonable donor has not studied the specific U.S. laws of
charitable pledges, the donor could be deceived by a pledge form that is
silent about enforceability.
B. Artificial Judicial Concoctions to Enforce Charitable Pledges
The facts can vary greatly among charitable pledge cases. In some
situations, the donor receives naming rights or other forms of valuable
public recognition, and sometimes not. In some situations, the donor and
the charity negotiate the terms of the pledge, and the donor knows that
the charity relies on the pledged funds to finance a particular project, and
sometimes not. Many pledges fall into a category that could be labeled
"standard charitable pledges," in which no significant negotiations be-
tween the donor and the charity took place, and the dollar amounts are
not material compared to the charity's overall fundraising operations.
61
Under typical legal rules, these standard pledges likely would not qualify
as contracts because of the consideration requirement.62 Additionally,
under normal promissory estoppel doctrine, these standard pledges
would likely be unenforceable because the charity could not prove sub-
stantial detrimental reliance. Nevertheless, courts overwhelmingly en-
force even these standard pledges by bending logic, twisting legal rules,
and creating legal fictions.
1. Twisting the Bilateral Contract Rules to Enforce.
A bilateral contract involves a promise in exchange for a promise.63
Courts often use two twisted approaches to find that a standard charitable
pledge is a bilateral contract.
Under the first approach, courts conclude that a pledge is a binding
bilateral contract on the theory that the charity's obligation to use all con-
tributed funds for a charitable purpose constitutes a return promise that
qualifies as consideration.64 Under its charter, articles of incorporation,
or other governing document, a charity must operate for charitable pur-
poses, both for purposes of state law65 and tax law.66 Some courts have
60. Id. (quoting the headnote from In re Hudson, 54 L.J. Ch. at 819).
61. See supra note 21 (describing a standard pledge).
62. Budig et al., supra note 9, at 51.
63. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 57.
64. See infra note 66.
65. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 65 (10th
ed. 2011) ("An organization is organized exclusively for one or more tax-exempt, chari-
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concluded that the charity's obligation is a promise that qualifies as con-
61sideration.
6
Other courts and commentators point out the logical and doctrinal
flaws in this approach. For instance, the charity's obligation could only
be consideration if it provides a benefit to the donor or is a detriment to
the charity.68 The charity cannot provide a private benefit to an individu-
al donor without jeopardizing its tax-exempt status,69 and there is no det-
riment to the charity in receiving money to fulfill its charitable mission.
Presumably, a charity would simply reject the contribution if a donor
wanted the donation to go toward a specific project that the charity did
not wish to undertake. Perhaps most important, the charity already has a
preexisting duty to use all funds received for a charitable purpose.
Moreover, it is a cardinal principle of contract law that a promise to ful-
fill a preexisting duty is not consideration.70  The Canadian Supreme
Court skillfully synthesizes the fallacies in the enforcement arguments
stating, "the promise implied in the acceptance involves no act advanta-
geous to the [donor] or detrimental to the [charity], and hence does not
table purposes only if its articles of incorporation limit its purposes to one or more ex-
empt purposes .... ).
66. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2013); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (1959); see Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 575 (1983) ("Underlying all relevant parts of
the [Internal Revenue] Code is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on
meeting certain common-law standards of charity.").
67. See, e.g., In re Morton Shoe Co., 40 B.R. 948, 951 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984)
("The pledge document.., clearly indicates that by accepting the subscription [the chari-
ty] agrees to apply the pledged amounts in accordance with the charitable purposes set
forth in its charter. This is sufficient consideration to support the promise."); Estate of
Couch v. Neb. Wesleyan Univ., 103 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Neb. 1960) (finding that the
school's promise to carry out the donor's wishes supplied the necessary consideration
when the donor made a pledge to donate a $5,000 scholarship to "worthy girls"); Central
Maine Gen. Hosp. v. Carter, 132 A. 417, 420 (Me. 1926) ("[A] promise, whether express
or implied, on the part of the promisee, in case of a proposed gift for a special purpose, to
devote the gift when received to the purpose named.., is a sufficient consideration to
support the promise to give .... ").
68. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891); PERILLO, supra note 9, at
152.
69. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2); Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(d)(1)(ii) (finding an organization will not qualify as tax-exempt under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) unless it serves a public rather than a private interest); see generally HOPKINS,
supra note 65, at 536-46 (discussing the private benefit doctrine).
70. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 226 ("[T]he charity has a duty to use its funds for
charitable purposes, and the performance of a pre-existing duty generally does not consti-
tute consideration."); In re Smith's Estate, 38 A. 66, 67 (Vt. 1897) (finding that in con-
nection with a charitable pledge, "[d]oing, or promising to do what one is already legally
bound to do, is not a sufficient consideration to uphold a contract, whether the previous
obligation arises by contract or by law independently of it"); PERILLO, supra note 9, at
176 ("For example, [imagine] B says to A, 'If you pay me the $50 you owe me, I promise
to give you a DVD worth $10.' B's promise is not enforceable because A... would
merely be doing what A was legally obligated to do.").
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involve a case of mutual promises and.. . the duty of the [charity]...
arise[s] from trusteeship rather than a contractual promise .... ,71
In a second twisted approach, courts sometimes hold that the return
promise derives from other donors pledging money to the same charity. 72
In effect, this approach reasons that, because of the first donor's promise
to contribute, other donors made a promise to give, which can allow the
charity to fulfill some charitable project. For example, in Congregation
B'Nai Sholom v. Martin,73 the donor signed a pledge stating that i was
made in consideration of the pledges of others, and the Michigan Su-
preme Court concluded that "the mutual promises between subscribers of
pledges for a [legal] purpose will constitute a consideration therefor.
' 74
Other courts highlight the serious logical and doctrinal deficiencies
with this approach. Under this approach, the donor promises to make
contributions to the charity, but the charity does not incur any legal det-
riment or provide any benefit to the donor. If multiple donors pledge and
one fails to pay, "no injury is done to the other [donors]. 76 Also, ordi-
narily the donor has not bargained for the contributions of others.77 As
one court observed, the donor's pledge "was utilized ... to obtain sub-
stantial pledges from others. But this was a technique employed to raise
money. It did not supply a legal consideration [for the donor's]
pledge.,78 Thus, there is no consideration, and there should be no en-
forceable bilateral contract.
71. Dalhousie Coll. at Halifax v. Boutilier Estate, 1934 CarswellNS 43, [1934]
S.C.R. 642, 3 D.L.R. 593, 597 (Can.1934) (WL).
72. See 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37.37,
at 234 n.82 (4th ed. 2000) (listing nine cases regarding this theory).
73. Congregation B'Nai Sholom v. Martin, 173 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1969).
74. Id. at 510, quoted in Budig et al., supra note 9, at 58.
75. See, e.g., Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484, 486-87 (Fla. 1974)
(holding pledge unenforceable even though pledge document recited that the pledge was
in consideration of the subscription of others); 1. & 1. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 12
N.E.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. 1938) ("It is unquestioned that the request that other subscribers
make contributions, ... stated as a consideration in the subscription agreement, is not
consideration .... ). But see PERILLO, supra note 9, at 226 ("If such an exchange actual-
ly is bargained for and actually occurs, consideration exists. E.g., 'I will give one million
dollars to alma mater if you will match my gift.' This is hardly what occurs in many large
fund-raising campaigns.").
76. STORY, supra note 52, § 453, quoted in Budig et al., supra note 9, at 52.
77. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 226 (observing that "[a subscription] may be motivat-
ed by [other gifts], but there is ordinarily no element of exchange between the various
promisors"); MURRAY, supra note 17, at 272 (noting that "the typical subscriber is not
bargaining for the promises of others").
78. Md. Nat'l. Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, 407 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Md.
1979).
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2. Twisting the Unilateral Contract Rules to Enforce.
A unilateral contract can arise if the promisor, namely the donor,
seeks the other party's performance rather than a promise to perform.79
In some cases, after the donor has made one or more contributions under
the pledge, the court has found a unilateral contract because the charity
used the money for charitable purposes.80 For example, in I. & . Hold-
ing Corp. v. Gainsburg,8' the court concluded that the donor made an
"offer of a unilateral contract which, when accepted by the charity by in-
curring liability in reliance thereon, [became] a binding obligation.,
82
This approach violates the preexisting duty rule. The charity al-
ready is required to use the funds received for charitable purposes:
81
"That a charity's mere continuation of its activit[ies] could form the basis
of a unilateral contract ... demonstrates how far the courts [are] willing
to stretch to enforce ... pledges.84
3. Twisting the Promissory Estoppel Doctrine to Enforce.
Some courts use promissory estoppel to dodge the logical and doc-
trinal conundrums with the consideration requirement when the court
wants to enforce a donor's pledge.85
A court can enforce a promise under promissory estoppel in the ab-
sence of consideration if three conditions are met: (1) there is a promise
which the "promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee or a third person"; (2) the promise
"does induce ... the action or forbearance;" and (3) "injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.,86 A key element under
promissory estoppel is detrimental reliance. The First Restatement of
Contracts required "action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
79. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 57 ("If A says to B, 'If you run in the New York
Marathon and finish I will pay you $1,000,' A has made a promise but has not asked B
for a return promise. A has asked B to perform, not for a commitment to perform.").
80. See, e.g., I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 12 N.E.2d 532, 534 (N.Y. 1938)
("[S]uch subscriptions are enforceable on the ground that they constitute an offer of a
unilateral contract which, when accepted by the charity by incurring liability in reliance
thereon, becomes a binding obligation.").
81. I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 12 N.E.2d 532 (N.Y. 1938).
82. Id. at 533-34.
83. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 226; see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
84. Budig et al., supra note 9, at 63.
85. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 218 (crediting Samuel Williston for "pull[ing] to-
gether an assortment of cases where promises without consideration had been enforced
on one theory or another" to develop the doctrine of promissory estoppel); see also Ben-
jamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents (Pt. 1), 50 MICH. L.
REV. 639, 644-53 (1952) (discussing charitable pledge cases).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
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character on the part of the promisee,"7 and the Second Restatement of
Contracts employs a more flexible approach considering multiple factors
including the definite and substantial nature of the reliances8
In the family context, courts use promissory estoppel to enforce a
promise to make a gift in the future if the promisee proves all three ele-
ments. For example, in Harvey v. Dow,89 the father made an implied
promise to give land to his daughter; the daughter built a $200,000 resi-
dence on the land with the father's assistance; and the court concluded
the daughter had relied on the father's promise of a gift, vacating the
lower court's judgment in favor of the father.9"
In regard to charitable pledges, "[A]s early as 1817, [a court con-
cluded] that persons could not withdraw their pledges after they stood by
silently watching the charity incur liability without objecting."9' Thus,
when the donor promises a very large, bellwether contribution, and as a
result the charity proceeds with a project, the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel could apply. 92
However, when the amounts are not material, it becomes much
more difficult to conclude that the donor should have foreseen the chari-
ty's reliance and that the charity relied to the extent that injustice will re-
sult if the pledge is not enforced. Leading commentators state, "in a giv-
en situation it may be difficult to discover a substantial change of posi-
position on the part of the charity in reliance on one or more subscription
promises[J"93 and charities cannot show substantial injurious reliance "in
the majority of [] cases."94 One court has even described the concoctions
of other courts in this area as "legal heresy."
95
Apparently, in an attempt to provide charities with an artificial ad-
vantage, a comment to the American Law Institute's (ALI) Second Re-
statement of Contracts provides that in charitable pledge cases the chari-
87. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 219 (emphasis added).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
89. Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322 (Me. 2008).
90. Id. at 327; see also Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759, 762 (Kan. 1930) (ordering a
mother to give her son the deed to an 80-acre tract of land after the mother made an im-
plied promise to give that land to the son and in reliance on that promise the son moved
from another part of the state).
91. Budig et al., supra note 9, at 53 n.14 (citing Trs. of Farmington Acad. v. Allen,
14 Mass. 172, 175-76 (1817)).
92. See, e.g., Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 104 A.2d 903, 907 (Del. 1954)
(applying promissory estoppel because the charity negotiated the details with the donor,
who was the president of the charity, and the donor agreed to guarantee the hospital's
bank loan for up to $40,000).
93. MURRAY, supra note 17, at 272.
94. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 226-27.
95. Danby, 104 A.2d at 907.
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ty's "reliance need not be of [a] substantial character.' 96 As this Article
will describe, this is just one of three instances in which the ALl has pro-
posed special, non-intuitive rules to try to help charities enforce pledg-
es.
97
4. ALl Proposal to Twist Promissory Estoppel Based on Public
Policy.
Perhaps recognizing that charities should not be able to use normal
promissory estoppel rules to enforce most pledges, the ALI, in Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, makes a more radical proposal. Although
only one state has embraced the ALI's more radical proposal,98 review-
ing the proposal will further illuminate the problems addressed in this
Article.
In § 90(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the ALl pro-
poses that, for charitable pledges (and marriage settlements), the party
seeking to enforce should not have to prove that "the promise induced
action or forbearance."99 Thus, the charity still would need to prove: (1)
the donor made a promise that he or she should have reasonably expected
would induce action or forbearance by the charity; and (2) injustice can
be avoided only by enforcing the pledge-but the charity would no long-
er need to prove actual reliance.'00 The ALI argues that this relaxation is
appropriate because "American courts have traditionally favored charita-
ble [pledges]... and have found consideration in many cases where the
element of exchange was doubtful or nonexistent."'10' Although ALI's
related Illustration 17 indicates that its approach is consistent with an
earlier New York case,10 2 and a New Jersey case subsequently has ap-
peared to adopt a similar public policy rationale for enforcing a charita-
ble pledge,103 only one state has explicitly embraced the ALI proposal to
date. 104
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b. (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
97. See infra Part III.C.
98. See Salsbury v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1974) (expressly
adopting the ALl proposal); P.H.C.C.C., Inc. v. Johnston, 340 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa
1983); In re Estate of Schmidt, No. 06-0330, 2006 WL 2561231, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App.
2006).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
100. See Budig et al., supra note 9, at 67.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. f(AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
102. Id. at § 90 cmt. f, illus. 17 (reporter's note) (stating that "Illustration 17 is based
on In re Field's Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1958)").
103. See Jewish Fed'n of Cent. N.J. v. Barondess, 560 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1989); see also More Game Birds in Am., Inc. v. Boettger, 14 A.2d 778,
779-80 (N.J. 1940).
104. See supra note 98 (citing Iowa cases).
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The ALI's more radical proposal again demonstrates that the en-
forceability of standard charitable pledges is inconsistent with traditional
legal rules. In an attempt to help charities, the ALI proposes a special
rule applicable only to charitable pledges and marriage settlements. This
Article's proposal also includes a special rule in the case of charitable
pledges based in part on a public policy rationale, but it would not apply
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the donor intended to
be legally bound.1°5
Ii. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON STANDARD FORMS: DONORS LEFT IN THE
DARK
Part I of this Article suggests an information imbalance. On the one
hand, typical donors should not be expected to know, either by common
sense or a basic familiarity with legal rules, that a charitable pledge is le-
gally enforceable. On the other hand, those engaged in the business of
raising funds for charity on a full-time basis likely are aware that charita-
ble pledges are enforceable in the overwhelming majority of situations. 1
06
Given this informational imbalance, how do charities deal with do-
nors? Do they use their standard pledge forms to clearly describe the re-
lationship of the parties in a spirit of transparency, honesty, and full dis-
closure? Or do they keep donors in the dark?
A. Only Five Percent Clearly Address Enforceability, Other Findings
Empirical research created for this Article suggests how charities
and their representatives use this information advantage. In a change
from prior practices, some charities are now posting their standard multi-
year pledge forms on their websites. Traditionally, fundraisers preferred
to personally deliver information to prospective donors, but now charities
are putting more information online in response to societal expecta-
tions. °7
A review of 57 pledge forms suggests some patterns and practices.
Addendum A lists the charities using these pledge forms. In gathering
pledge forms, we omitted (i) pledge forms for employee payroll deduc-
tions, (ii) perpetual credit card pledge forms, 1 8 and (iii) forms anticipat-
105. See infra Part II.B.
106. See Trozpek, supra note 2, at 1-2.
107. See Drew Lindsay, YourNameHere.Org, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June
2015, at 22 ("We are used to accessing everything online, from bank accounts to our
reading materials. Why not have these marketing pieces online?") (quoting Mary Solo-
mons, senior director of donor relations at Skidmore College discussing charitable nam-
ing rights).
108. Forms found in the process of the survey, which provided for the charity to
charge the donor's credit card periodically for the lifetime of the donor, allowed the do-
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ing all donations within one year. Charities and donors can use the great
majority of the remaining forms at any time; most of these forms are not
specifically tied to a particular fundraising campaign or capital project.
Approximately 95 percent of the pledge forms fail to clearly discuss
enforceability. As examples of those disclosing enforceability, the
pledge form for the Pepperdine University Women's Swimming and
Diving Team states, in the preamble, "[t]his Pledge Agreement sets forth
the terms and conditions of the underlying commitment and is intended
to be binding on the parties."'10 9 Furthermore, the first numbered para-
graph of the form provides: "The Donor hereby irrevocably pledges to
donate the sum of ($. each year for the next
four years commencing with a gift after January 1, 2010 and before Jan-
uary 31, 2010."'11° The University of Miami's Agreement of Gift (Build-
ing Fund Commitment) provides in part that, "if for any reason the Gift
has not been satisfied before the Donor's death, the balance shall be a
debt of the Donor's estate and payable by the Donor's estate to the Uni-
versity."'
Another ten percent of the pledge forms arguably provide the donor
with some clue that the pledge might be legally enforceable. These
forms tend to fall into two groups. First, approximately five percent of
the forms state that the donor "agree[s]" to pay the pledge.112 Second,
another five percent use the language found in some reported cases that
the pledge is made "in consideration of the gifts of others.""' 3  Other
nor to cancel with notice. See, e.g., Make a Gift, DEPAUL UNIV.,
https://alumni.depaul.edu/GiveNow/Home (click on "recurring gifts" under the heading
"Contribution Type") (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (stating that the donor may change the
recurring gift at any time by contacting the gift processing office);, Gft/Pledge Form,
UNIV. OF TENN. FOUND., http://www.utfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Gift-Pledge-
FDN.pdf (stating that the donor may "stop or change the amount at any time").
109. Pepperdine University Women's Swimming and Diving Team Campaign
Pledge Commitment: December 1, 2009 to January 31, 2010, PEPPERDINE UNIV.,
http://pepperdinepledge.parvesh.net/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (emphasis added).
110. Id. (emphasis added). The Pepperdine form may be an outlier because the or-
ganization was at a crossroads. Apparently, the program needed $400,000 to continue in
operation as a NCAA team. The pledge form states that if the fund drive fails to raise
$400,000, the Pepperdine University Women's Swimming and Diving Program could
become a campus club sport and would refund all contributions made to the donors, and
the charity would cancel the balances remaining on the pledges. Id.
111. Agreement of Gift (Building Fund Commitment), at 8, UNIv. OF MIAMI (re-
vised Aug. 21, 2015),
http://advancement.miami.edu/NetCommunity/document.doc?id=95 (emphasis added).
112. See e.g., Multi-Year Pledge Agreement, UNiv. OF RICHMOND,
http://alumni.richmond.edu/events/reunion/2015%2OReunion%20MYP%20Form.pdf;
Gifts or Pledges to the University of Iowa Foundation, UNIV. OF IOWA,
https://www.iowalum.com/dciowa/BoydPledge form.pdf.
113. See e.g., Gifts or Pledges to the University of Iowa Foundation, supra note 112;
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forms employ phrases that suggest some level of intent other than the
simple use of the word "pledge," but on balance these forms fall short of
providing the donor with a reasonable clue that the pledge might be le-
gally binding."4 A few are more ambiguous, such as the University of
California at Berkeley's form which states, "I will use best efforts to, and
fully intend to, satisfy my pledged commitment."'115
A standard charitable pledge form typically is less than one page
and covers the following topics: the gift amount, the number of dona-
tions, the timing of donations (e.g., monthly, quarterly, annually), dona-
tion method (e.g., check or credit card), designated purpose (e.g. school,
campus, scholarship fund, lecture series, or other program), matching gift
information, donor information (e.g., name, address, phone number,
email address), and publicity preference (e.g., anonymous, in honor of a
decedent, naming rights, or other). This study indicates the charities do
not include the boiler-plate clauses usually included in a binding con-
tract, such as a forum selection clause, choice of law clause, jurisdiction
and venue clause, severability clause, waiver clause, or costs of collec-
tion and attorney fees clause.
B. Reflections on Empirical Evidence
Why do approximately 95 percent of charities reject transparency,
failing to clearly inform prospective donors about enforceability? It
would seem that pledge forms could include at least one sentence to
make it clear to all involved whether the pledge is intended to be legally
binding.1 6 Presumably the overriding motive is to generate more pledg-
es.
Independent of the substance, a short pledge form is more appealing
to a donor than a long form. Keeping the form short and simple allows
the donor to read and complete the form quickly. Because gifts may be
2009-2010 Gift/Pledge Agreement, UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH-BRADFORD,
http://www.upb.pitt.edu/uploadedFiles/giving/Gif.pledge.form%202009-1O.pdf.
114. See e.g., Pledge Form for Outright Gift, UNIV. OF WASH.,
http://depts.washington.edu/uwadv/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/pledgSEA.pdf (men-
tioning "intent to contribute");
Commitment to Carolina, UNIV. OF N.C.-CHAPEL HILL,
https://secure.dev.unc.edu/resources/pdf/gift/pledgeForm.pdf (mentioning "commit-
ment")h
Gift/Pledge Form, UNIV. OF TENN. FOUND., supra note 108 (mentioning "commit-
ment").
115. Making a Gift, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY,
https://give.berkeley.edu/lib/pdfUCB PledgeCard. 1001 08.pdf.
116. See ALl DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at cmt. b (advising that "the charity
should endeavor to ensure that the documentation resolves doubts").
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emotionally inspired,"17 a donor's inclination may change as emotions
cool. From a marketing prospective, charities likely are smart to use
short forms with no legalese.
Considering the substance, language such as "legally enforceable"
or "legally binding" in the pledge form may inspire the donor to consult
their financial advisor, reflect more carefully about the pledge, and ask
questions-Am I willing to donate all this money if the charity does
things I do not support?18 If I move out of town?"19 Or if my family suf-
fers financial reverses?120 Furthermore, legalese within the pledge form
may inspire the donor to consult an attorney, which could slow down the
process and provide greater opportunities for the prospective donor's
emotions to cool.
These same forces are involved with other charitable giving forms.
For example, a charitable gift annuity is a rather complex financial trans-
action, but typical charitable gift annuity forms are very brief,'2' usually
only two pages. With a charitable gift annuity, the donor contributes
money or property (such as marketable securities), the charity becomes
the owner of the gifted property, but the charity agrees to make a stream
of fixed payments to the donor for the donor's lifetime. 22 Given that a
charitable gift annuity document usually is only two pages,123 it is not en-
tirely surprising that charities would tend to provide donors with a lacon-
ic pledge form. Nevertheless this Article asserts that the failure to dis-
close the enforceability of a pledge is unfair and causes problems. 124
The current situation is disturbing. Courts twist legal rules to help
charities regardless of the language of the pledge form. Perhaps in re-
sponse, charities choose not to disclose the legal consequences to pro-
spective donors because there is no economic incentive for honesty. This
Article seeks to end this unsavory relationship with a new approach dis-
cussed in the rest of this Article.
117. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
119. See Woodmere Acad. v. Steinberg, 363 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (N.Y. 1977).
120. See Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 5.
121. See e.g., Sample Agreement Charitable Gift Annuity, HAMPTON RoADs CMTY.
FOUND. http://www.hamptonroadscf'org/advisors/forms/CharitableGifAnnuity.pdf (two-
page form); Sample Gift Annuity Contract: Immediate Gift Annuity Contract, SACRA-
MENTO REGION CMTY. FOUND.,
http://www.kvie.org/support/legacycircle/samplegiftiannuitycontract.pdf (two-page
form).
122. See generally Terry L. Simmons, Planning Opportunities with Gift Annuities,
SJ087 ALI-ABA 171, 171 (2004) (available on Westlaw; Secondary Sources database)
("Excluding will gifts, gift annuities are probably the oldest and perhaps most commonly
used planned giving vehicles in existence today.").
123. See supra note 120.
124. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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III. PROPOSAL: NORMAL RULES PLUS A DONOR EXPECTATION RULE
This Article proposes that a court follow a two-step process in de-
ciding whether a charitable pledge is enforceable. First, the court should
apply normal legal rules, specifically contract law and promissory estop-
pel, without any special rules for charities. This Article asserts that times
have changed, and courts will be able to enforce many substantial pledg-
es without resorting to special rules or artificial concoctions. Second, if
the pledge cannot be enforced under normal legal rules, the court should
still enforce if the charity can prove with clear and convincing evidence
that the donor intended the pledge to be legally binding.
A. First Prong: Enforcing with Normal Legal Rules
1. Charitable Naming Rights and Contract Law
This Article asserts that unlike in the past, in the modem fundrais-
ing marketplace, normal contract law 125 frequently permits enforcement
of substantial pledges. A promise must be supported by consideration to
be enforceable as a contract.126 In this context, two key rules can guide
the application of the consideration requirement. On the one hand, in
general, the law will not question the adequacy of the consideration.
127
Thus, as long as the donor received some non-trivial benefit or the chari-
ty incurred some non-trivial legal detriment, the law will not evaluate
whether the donor received equal value from the charity.128 A popular,
but misleading, phrase reflecting this principle is that valid consideration
can be a "mere peppercorn."'129 On the other hand, there is a failure of
125. For purposes of this Article, "normal contract law" is contract law without spe-
cial rules for charities.
126. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
127. See KNAPP, ET AL., supra note 26, at 121 ("It is an 'elementary principle that
the law will not enter into an inquiry as to the adequacy of the consideration.' This rule
is almost as old as the law of consideration itself."); see also PERILLO, supra note 9, at
154 ("Courts ... have believed that it would be an unwarranted interference with free-
dom of contract if they were to relieve an adult party from a bad exchange."); Hamer v.
Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891) ("Courts will not ask whether the thing which
forms the consideration does in fact benefit the promisee or a third party, or is of any sub-
stantial value to anyone. It is enough that something is promised, done, forborne or suf-
fered by the party to whom the promise is made as consideration for the promise made to
him.").
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("If
the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of ... equiva-
lence in the values exchanged.").
129. Joseph Siprut, Comment, The Peppercorn Reconsidered Why a Promise to Sell
Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding But Should Be, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1809, 1816 (2003) (stating that Professor Allan Farnsworth appears to think that nominal
consideration binds a promisor).
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consideration unless both parties believe the return promise or action re-
ally is consideration.130  For a hypothetical demonstrating this second
rule, imagine a father wants to make a binding promise to give his son
$1,000 in the future; upon learning such a promise would not be enforce-
able as a contract because of lack of consideration, the parties agree that
the son will give the father a book worth $1 in consideration of the fa-
ther's promise.131 In this situation, there is a failure of consideration, and
therefore no enforceable contract, because neither the son nor the father
believe the book is consideration for the promise.
In the past, courts often struggled to find consideration to support a
charitable pledge because the charity provided no benefit to the donor
and the charity incurred no legal detriment that the donor bargained for.
Things have changed because donors now are buying meaningful naming
rights with their substantial pledges.
13 2
Traditionally, anonymous giving was the norm. 133 Big donors fre-
quently were content with securing a place on the charity's board of di-
rectors and thereby acquiring the right to hobnob with the other swells on
130. Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 95 (N.Y. 1918) (stating the test in a rather neg-
ative fashion: "Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties").
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71, cmt. b, Illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); see also Weed v. Weed, 968 A.2d 310 (Vt. 2008) (a payment of $10 for a tract of
land to a family member was not considered consideration).
132. Charities may apply special rules to enhance the naming rights available with a
pledge. Specifically, some charitable pledge forms provide that all donations called for
under a multi-year pledge will be aggregated in assigning rights in the first year. See e.g.,
Reunion Giving, Come Back, Give Back! Pledge Form, UNIV. OF VA.,
http://giving.virginia.edu/reunions/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2013/09/Pledge-Form.pdf
("The full amount of this commitment will be reflected in the class total. In addition, the
donor(s) will be recognized .. "). In addition, employer matching gifts may be added
to the donor's pledge amount to assign the public recognition. See e.g., id. ("Gifts to the
University through employer matching programs are credited to the donor and count to-




These special rules may allow a donor to claim naming opportunities that otherwise
might be out of reach. Imagine Wake Forest University will name the primary practice
tee at its golf facility for a $250,000 donation, see Lindsay, supra note 107, at 22. Duck
Hook Donor might pledge $25,000 per year for five years (for a total of $125,000), and if
his employer provides a dollar-for-dollar match, Duck Hook Donor could acquire the
naming rights in the year when he signs the pledge form.
133. See Sarah Murray, Institutional Naming Rights Gaining Favour Among
Wealthy Donors, FIN. TIMES-LONDON, (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:11 AM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5cl d62e0-3834-11 e4-a687-
00144feabdcO.html#axzz3vkbsyie7 (stating that donors in Europe prefer to "keep a low
profile").
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the board.134 Anonymous giving was encouraged3 5 and was typical.
136
Charities granted public recognition and naming rights only sporadical-
ly.' 37 In Europe, anonymous giving is still the norm.
138
But in the U.S., the popularity of charitable naming rights exploded
in the mid-1990S.139 "[D]eals involving naming rights. .. have expanded
dramatically... in scope, creativity, number and dollar volume. .,140
A study found that "[i]n the winter of 2008... there were more than
50,000 naming opportunities published on the Web sites of nonprof-
its[,] 14 1 and this may significantly underestimate the prevalence.
142
"[T]he ability to raise money through naming opportunities has become a
staple tool. . . . These days, "organizations ... cannot hope to raise
the sums required for ambitious [projects] without being able to dangle
the carrot of a donor's name emblazoned over the door."'144
For some wealthy donors, charitable naming rights may be especial-
ly attractive because they establish a pecking order. A survey of 30,000
naming opportunities revealed that in "over [90] percent of [charitable
naming] strategies[,] .... nonprofits... use a double-up or double-down
134. See FRANCIS OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE
PHILANTHROPY 44 (1995) (discussing the link between levels of donations and obtaining
positions on charitable committees).
135. Anonymous Giving: Acts of Charity that Have No Name, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1985, at 1, 1985 WLNR 1007541 (reporting that "anonymous philanthropy ... in Juda-
ism go[es] back to [ 12th Century Jewish philosopher Moses] Maimonides' eight levels of
charity. Anonymous philanthropy.., is the highest form").
136. See e.g., Charles Isherwood, The Graffiti of the Philanthropic Class, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, § 2, at 6.
137. One reporter discusses a "donor plaque and engraving on a Sumerian tablet...
5,000 years ago." Henry Goldstein, When Wealthy Philanthropists Put Their Mouth
Where Their Money Is, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 28, 2002, at 1, quoted in John
K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming Gifts: When
Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375, 379 n.9 (2005). Oxford University
named a professorship after King Henry the VII's mother in 1502. See Terry BURTON,
NAMING RIGHTS: LEGACY GIFTS & CORPORATE MONEY 114 (2008) (regarding the "La-
dy Margaret Professorship of Divinity"). In 1679, John Harvard acquired naming rights
to a school in Massachusetts for 779 British pounds and 400 books. William P. Barrett,
Cash Strapped Charities Put Donors' Names On Just About Everything, 184 FORBES 74
(Sept. 21, 2009), 2009 WLNR 17618601.
138. See Murray, supra note 133.
139. BURTON, supra note 137, at 49 (2008) (discussing a "groundswell of naming
rights activities" since the mid-1990s).
140. Barrett, supra note 137, at 760; see also BURTON, supra note 137, at 50, 126
(estimating that donors paid $4 billion in naming gifts in 2007).
141. BURTON, supra note 137, at 169.
142. Lindsay, supra note 107, at 22 (quoting a researcher that when he inquires
about naming rights on the telephone, frequently a charity's representative will say
"'That's private information,' and just slam the phone down").
143. Robin Pogrebin, Goodbye, Avery Fisher. Hello, Somebody Else, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2014, at Al.
144. Id. at A21.
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[pricelist] when setting the ask amount for named gifts., 145 For example,
a charity may design the pricelist so that a donor needs to contribute $ 10
million to name the building; $5 million for the lobby; $2.5 million for
the conference center, and so on.146 Thus, in a world of gray areas,
where it can be difficult to determine who is the wealthiest, the most
generous, the most noble, or the most powerful, charitable naming rights
at the top end of a charity's pricelist give the wealthy a chance to declare
their position in the pecking order among their peers, the rising stars, and
the pretenders.
Charitable naming rights are not acquired by just the very wealthy
top pledgers. "Modem fundraisers have aggressively expanded what can
be named to include virtually every element of a capital project ... .
A few examples: Fordham University School of Law listed 250 naming
opportunities in connection with its new building; the University of
Rochester Medical Center listed 370 items in connection with a $58 mil-
lion campaign; and the Camegie Museum of Natural History will list the
donors who contribute at least $25 to it's Adopt-a-Bone campaign to
promote its dinosaur exhibit.148 Donors have acquired charitable naming
rights for individual steps on a staircase at a theater, lockers at college
football stadiums,149 park benches, trees,150 commemorative bricks,151
and many other items,152 including restrooms.
53
145. BURTON, supra note 137, at 166-67.
146. Idat 167.
147. Lindsay, supra note 107, at 22.
148. Id. at 21 (Fordham Law School); id. at 20 (Rochester); Pierre Ruhe, Rooms,
bricks-you name it, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Apr. 12, 2008, at Al, 2008 WLNR
68675767 (regarding the Adopt-a-Bone program).
149. Eason, supra note 137, at 378 n.2; Eric Gibson, Giving Without Giving a Darn
Who Gets the Credit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2001, at W13 (regarding steps on a staircase);
Kathleen Teltsch, The Memorial Alumni Boulder-Colleges Are Naming Anything and
Everything to Get Donors'Bucks, S.F. CHRON., July 4, 1993, at 5, 1993 WLNR 2607110
(the opportunity to name individual lockers in the men's football team locker room sold
for $1,000); Todd D. Milewski, 45,000 Gets Football Player's Name on Locker: UW-
Madison, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison), May 8, 2013, at 23, 2013 WLNR 11346713 (dis-
cussing a campaign targeting "football alumni for donations"); see also id. ("Even the Pitt
Law School is ... offering nameplates on student lockers for a $1,000 donation to the
Law Fellows Society.").
150. Eason, supra note 137, at 378 n.3.
151. See Bert Roughton, Jr., Olympic Facelift: A Master Plan for Downtown; Payne
Proposes "Olympic Legacy, " ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 19, 1993, at A1, 1993 WLNR
2369244.
152. Murray, supra note 133 (discussing a community organization for homeless
people in North Carolina that allows "benefactors to make small donations to name eve-
rything from dental floss to bunk beds ... for their donation they get a certificate with an
image of the object and their name or that of someone they want to honour.").
153. See e.g., Murray, supra note 133 (donor contributed $100,000 to Harvard Law
School to have a plaque with his name outside the toilets in Wasserstein Hall); Barrett,
supra note 137, (discussing Brad Feld's $25,000 donation to the University of Colorado
[Vol. 120:2
CHARITABLE PLEDGES: CONTRACTS OF CONFUSION
Charities frequently offer naming opportunities unrelated to physi-
cal structures,54 such as for scholarship funds or funds to endow a lec-
ture series.155 "Named professorships are more common than the grass in
the summer."1 56 Other charities offer naming opportunities to other key
posts, such as the curator at the museum or the medical director at the
hospital.157 While private universities were trailblazers in offering nam-
ing opportunities to donors,158 more recently public schools159 and social
service organizations, from the Salvation Army to the YMCA, have
adopted the practice.'
60
Commentators have observed the disappearance of anonymous giv-
ing. "Whatever happened to Anonymous? ... [W]hat became of those
wealthy philanthropists who used to support... charitable institutions
without requiring that their names be slapped somewhere-anywhere, it
sometimes seems-on a building."'161 In 2007, when a group of alumni
raised $85 million for a new business school at the University of Wis-
consin-Madison with a stipulation that there be no naming rights, it was
called "unprecedented." 1
62
But does a grant of charitable naming rights or other public recogni-
tion qualify as consideration under traditional legal principles? Is the
donor receiving a benefit? In 2014, the unraveling of a charitable nam-
ing rights deal highlighted their monetary value. In 1973, electronics
magnate Avery Fisher donated $10.5 million to the Lincoln Center for
the renovation of its New York Philharmonic Hall, and the charity agreed
to rename it Avery Fisher Hall. 163 The pledge agreement stated that the
at Boulder; the University displays the donor's name on a lavatory along with the inscrip-
tion, "The Best Ideas Often Come at Inconvenient Times-Don't Ever Close Your Mind
to Them"); Michael Gross, Charities Get Inventive with Name-Dropping, MSNBC (June
14, 2006, 2:46 PM) http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25147900/ns/us-news-giving/t/charities-
get-inventive-name-dropping/ (reporting that Ellen and Jerome Stem donated $100,000
and can now "see [their] names writ large on the [New Museum of Contemporary Art's]
four restrooms").
154. Murray, supra note 133.
155. Philip Fine, US.: Naming Rights Net Millions-But at a Price, UNIV. WORLD
NEWS (Mar. 2, 2008),
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story-20080228160422788.
156. Id.
157. BURTON, supra note 137, at 120.
158. Id. at 11,20.
159. See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment: Perfect
Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (reporting that "[s]chool boards across the country...
[have entered] into naming rights deals [in exchange for] hundreds of millions of dol-
lars").
160. BURTON, supra note 137, at xiv; id. at 65.
161. Isherwood, supra note 136, § 2, at 6.
162. BURTON, supra note 137, at 7-8.
163. Eason, supra note 137, at 449; see also Pogrebin, supra note 143, at A16 (stat-
ing that the gift was $10 million).
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name Avery Fisher Hall "will appear on tickets, brochures, program an-
nouncements and advertisements and the like.., in perpetuity ....
When Lincoln Center later needed to renovate the philharmonic hall and
advertised that hey would rename the hall after a new donor, the Fisher
family protested.165 Eventually Lincoln Center paid the Fisher family
$15 million to release their naming rights and agreed to publicly recog-
nize the family in several new ways.166 In addition, the purchase price
paid for naming rights to sports venues further supports the view that
naming rights have value, because commercial firms typically pay from
5 to 25 percent of the total construction cost of a stadium for the naming
rights.167 Many commentators have observed the value of reputation,
whether for generosity or other valued traits.'68 Conspicuous donations
signal wealth, power, and generosity to others. 169 The father of modem
economics, Adam Smith, observed that the uber-rich tend to pursue even
greater riches not for increased physical comfort; rather, they seek the
praise of others.
170
Strangely, the IRS consistently has declined to value naming
rights.171  Theoretically, the IRS could reduce a donor's income tax
charitable deduction by the value of the naming rights received in ex-
164. Pogrebin, supra note 143, at A16; Eason, supra note 137, at 456.
165. See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum
of Charitable Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1228 (2007) ("Lincoln Center like-
ly forestalled a lawsuit from the family"); Eason, supra note 137, at 450, 455, 455 n.359
(describing the arguments posted on the website of the Fisher family's law firm).
166. Pogrebin, supra note 143, at Al, A21 (listing "a promise to feature prominent
tributes to Mr. Fisher in the new lobby," and "Mr. Fisher will be inducted into a new Lin-
coln Center Hall of Fame [and] ... [a] Fisher family member will serve on the Hall of
Fame's advisory board... [and] promises to give a higher profile to the Avery Fisher
Artist [awards] Program ... ").
167. William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming
Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 63, 94-96 (2011) (including data on pro sports arena
transactions).
168. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act 3, sc. 3 ("Good name in man and
woman... [is] the immediate jewel of their souls."); Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) ("[An] important and often-neglected aspect of
human motivation ... is that... actors seek not an absolute end, but relative position
among peers . . . . [w]hether it is termed 'status,' 'prestige,' or 'distinction,' people
sometimes seek-as an end in itself-relative position ....") (emphasis in original).
169. Eric A. Posner, Law and Society & Law and Economics: Common Ground, Ir-
reconcilable Differences, New Directions: Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts
and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 575-76 (1997).
170. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 112-13 (D.D. Raphael &
A.L. Macfie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759), quoted in McAdams, supra note 168, at
10.
171. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-50-009, 1993 WL 521475 (Sept. 14, 1993) (discussing
Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 and stating that public recognition has "no monetary
value"); Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383.
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change for the donation.172 Perhaps the publicity about the $15 million
sale of the Avery Fisher naming rights will inspire the IRS to reconsider
its position. 
173
There are other issues in deciding whether a pledge in exchange for
naming rights is a binding contract. Even if there is a benefit to the do-
nor, did the parties intend the naming rights to be consideration?174 Was
the consideration bargained for?175 Also, if the transaction is part- gift
(without consideration) and part-sale (with consideration), is the entire
transaction still an enforceable contract?
Whether the parties intend naming rights to be consideration, and
whether the naming rights were bargained for, will depend on the partic-
ular facts. If the parties actually negotiated over naming rights or other
public recognition, then the parties likely intended the recognition to be
consideration, and the recognition induced the pledge. The inquiry may
be complicated because the charity may offer the naming rights "Chinese
takeout menu" style176 on its website or otherwise in connection with the
capital campaign, so there is no need for the donor to negotiate. Howev-
er, in the case of a substantial pledge, the donor may want to negotiate
for other public recognition rights. For example, in the case of naming a
building, the donor may ask for signage of a certain size, color, and de-
sign; particular lighting on the sign; the donor's name on letterhead and
business cards of employees working in the building; a mention of the
donor's surname when answering the phone; or certain publicity on the
charity's website. In addition, the donor may negotiate to have his or her
portrait in a prominent location.
Also, the donor may contribute the exact amount necessary to ac-
quire the naming right. For example, the charity may advertise that the
naming opportunity for its meditation garden is available for a $50,000
172. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986); Rev. Rul. 67-
246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(h)(ii)(5) ex. 2 (1990).
173. See supra note 165 (regarding Lincoln Center's $15 million payment to the
Fisher family); Linda Sugin, Opinion, Your Name on a Building and a Tax Break, Too,
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/1 /opinion/rethinking-
taxes-and-david-geffens-gift-for-avery-fisher-hall.html?_-r0 (suggesting that the "Treas-
ury Department could design a sliding scale" that would reduce a donor's income tax
charitable deduction based on the duration of the naming rights; the longer the duration of
the naming rights, the smaller the donor's income tax deduction).
174. Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 95 (N.Y. 1919); see supra note 129 (regarding
the view that a nominal benefit or detriment will not be consideration because the parties
do not consider it consideration).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); see
Meincke v. Nw. Bank & Tr. Co., 756 N.W.2d 223, 228 (Iowa 2008) ("For consideration
to be 'bargained for,' the consideration must 'induce' the making of the promise.").
176. See Lindsay, supra note 107, at 23.
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donation.'77 If the donor pledges exactly $50,000 and declines to give
anonymously, this would be evidence that the parties intended the nam-
ing rights as consideration and that the naming rights induced the pledge.
The fact that the donor never contributed such a large amount before
would be further evidence of an exchange, but if the donor contributes
$50,000 every few years, usually anonymously, then the naming rights
are less likely to have induced the pledge.
In regard to whether the entire transaction is supported by consider-
ation when the transaction is part-gift and part-bargain, commentators
address similar situations between family members, friends, and oth-
ers.78 A court has held that if an employer amends a written employ-
ment agreement, in part as a gift to reward the employee for past services
and in part for future services to be rendered, the entire amendment is
supported by consideration, endorsing the principle that "a promise that
is supported by a mixture of gift and bargain is supported by adequate
consideration."'
179
Based on an Iowa case'80 and several cases cited therein, Professor
Murray provides the following example: "If Ames has a house for sale
which has a reasonable market value of $100,000, is her agreement to
sell that house to her only child for $25,000 supported by considera-
tion?"181 Professor Murray concludes that the $25,000 is sufficient con-
sideration to support the entire transaction because (i) the price is more
than nominal, thereby distinguishing situations when the parties agree on
a small amount merely to try to satisfy the consideration requirement;
182
(ii) "courts will not normally inquire into the adequacy of consideration,
i.e., the relative values exchanged by the parties;"'' 83 and (iii) although
Ames "clearly [is] ... motivated by a desire to make a gift to her child,
she also wants the payment of $25,000.,,184 A comment to the ALI's
Second Restatement of Contracts supports this approach stating, "Even
where both parties know that a transaction is in part a bargain and in part
a gift, the element of bargain may nevertheless furnish consideration for
177. Id. at 22 (reporting that the Conway Recreation Center in South Carolina of-
fered naming rights to its meditation garden for $50,000).
178. See e.g., MURRAY, supra note 17, at 270.
179. Pasant v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 94, 98 (5th. Cir. 1995), citing
with approval JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
4-7 at 200 (3d ed. 1987).
180. Fritz v. Fritz, 767 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (listed in a "Decisions
Without Published Opinions" table), 2009 WL 779544 (printing full opinion) ("An altru-
istic motive may coexist with a valid legal contract, supported by consideration.").
181. MURRAY, supra note 17, at 270.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also PERILLO, supra note 9, at 154.
184. MURRAY, supra note 17, at 270.
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the entire transaction.'' 8 5 The ALl supports this result even when the
bargain motivation is merely incidental when compared to the gift moti-
vation: "Unless both parties know that the purported consideration is
mere pretense, it is immaterial that the promisor's desire for the consid-
eration is incidental to other objectives and even that the other party
knows this to be so.
' 186
There is judicial authority that a charity's promise of naming rights
can constitute consideration to make a pledge an enforceable contract.
The seminal case on the enforceability of charitable pledges1 87 involved a
naming right, but the facts are so unusual, and Justice Cardozo's analysis
is so esoteric,'88 that the opinion perhaps has created more confusion than
clarity. Entire law review articles have been devoted to the Allegheny
College opinion.189
Allegheny College sent Mary Yates Johnston an "appeal to contrib-
ute" as part of a drive to add $1.25 million to its endowment.190 There is
no indication that the college sent a standard pledge form; instead, Mary
wrote a letter providing on the front:
Estate Pledge ... In consideration of my interest in Christian Educa-
tion, and in consideration of others subscribing, I hereby subscribe
and will pay to... Allegheny College ... $5,000. This obligation
shall become due thirty days after my death ... . The proceeds of
this obligation shall be added to the Endowment ... or expended in
accordance with instructions on [the] reverse side of this pledge. 191
The reverse side stated in part, "In loving memory this gift shall be
known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund... [and] shall be
used to educate students preparing for the Ministry."' 92 Although the let-
ter provided that the pledge would be paid from her estate, Ms. Johnston
paid $1,000 to the college during her lifetime, and the college "set the
[$1,000] aside to be held as a scholarship fund for the benefit of [minis-
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
186. Id. § 81 cmt. b (emphasis added).
187. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cty Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
188. See Arthur B. Schwartz, Note, The Second Circuit "Estopped:" There Is No
Promissory Estoppel in New York, 19 CARDOzO L. REV. 1201, 1217 (1997) ("Allegheny
is quite possibly the most misunderstood case dealing with consideration theory and
promissory estoppel in New York.").
189. See e.g., Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited. Cardozo, Considera-
tion, and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149 (2005); Mike Townsend,
Cardozo 's Allegheny College Opinion: A Case Study in Law As An Art, 33 Hous. L.
REV. 1103 (1996).
190. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 173-74.
191. Id. at 174.
192. Id.
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try] students."'193 Eight months later, Ms. Johnston "gave notice to the
college that she repudiated the promise."'94 Thirty days after her death,
Allegheny College sued her estate for the $4,000 pledge balance.'95
Justice Cardozo initially indicated that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel was the likely approach for enforcing a charitable pledge.196 As
a policy argument, he quoted with approval those courts stating that to
argue a charitable pledge is unenforceable for lack of consideration is a
breach of "faith toward the public" and an "unwarrantable disappoint-
ment of the reasonable expectations of those interested."
' 197
Although Justice Cardozo stated that the promissory estoppel cases
should not be overruled in part because the consideration requirement is
a "concept which.., came into our law, not so much from any reasoned
conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice and pro-
cedure,"198 ultimately he did not rest the holding on promissory estoppel.
Instead, Justice Cardozo concluded that the arrangement was an enforce-
able bilateral contract.'99 Justice Cardozo said Ms. Johnston "wished to
have a memorial to perpetuate her name," and "[t]he moment that the
college accepted $1,000 as a payment on account, there was an assump-
tion of a duty to do whatever acts were customary ... in the spirit of its
creation.,200 He asserted that if the college received the full $4,000 bal-
ance of the pledge, it would have a duty to publicize the Mary Yates
Johnston Scholarship.2°1 Justice Cardozo stressed the mutual obliga-
202tions, noting that if the college ever treated the $1,000 as an "anony-
mous donation.., the [donor] would have been at liberty to treat this...
as the repudiation of a duty impliedly assumed... justifying a refusal" to




196. Id. at 175, citing with approval Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18 (N.Y. 1854) (as-
serting that "we have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of
consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions.").
197. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 175, quoting with approval Barnes v. Perine, 12
N.Y. 18 (N.Y. 1854) and other cases.
198. Allegheny Coll., 159 N.E. at 175. Justice Cardozo stated that, under the tradi-
tional law of contract, "[i]f A promises B to make a gift, consideration may be lacking,
though B has renounced other opportunities for betterment in the faith that the promise
will be kept." Id. at 174.
199. Id. at 176.
200. Id. at 175.
201. Id. at 176 (finding that "the time to affix her name to the memorial will not ar-
rive until the entire fund has been collected").
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In regard to whether there is consideration in a part-gift and part-
bargain transaction, Justice Cardozo had two replies. First, "[i]f a person
chooses to make an extravagant promise for an inadequate considera-
tion[,] it is his own affair.., be it never so small, [there] is a sufficient
consideration ... .,20 Second, "[t]he longing for posthumous remem-
brance is an emotion not so weak as to justify us in saying that its gratifi-
cation is a negligible good.,205 In his most important conclusion on char-
itable naming rights, Justice Cardozo stated that the consideration
requirement was satisfied here, and that the college and Ms. Johnston
were parties to a bilateral contract, because "the duty assumed by the
[college] to perpetuate the name of the founder of the memorial is suffi-
cient in itself to give validity to the [pledge] within the rules that define
consideration .... ,,206
The facts of Allegheny College are more complex and make the bi-
lateral contract analysis much more difficult than with a typical, modem
naming rights pledge. In Allegheny College, the college did not offer the
naming rights to the donor; instead, the donor initiated the naming rights
topic and initially referred to the pledge in a letter as either being added
to the endowment, (presumably without naming rights) or creating a
scholarship fund with naming rights; nothing clearly indicated how Ms.
Johnston wanted to treat the $1,000 donation during her life. After the
College received the $1,000 from Ms. Johnston, it apparently awarded no
scholarships and provided no public recognition to Ms. Johnston until
after her death, and Ms. Johnston attempted to repudiate the balance of
the pledge,20 7 perhaps thereby indicating she did not believe it was en-
forceable.
In a typical, modem naming rights situation, the charity would pub-
licize the naming rights and the corresponding ask amounts,20 8 and the
donor would affirmatively fill out a pledge form (or card) and elect in
writing to forego anonymity.20 9 Thus, the two promises in the bilateral
contract would be the charity's promise to provide the naming rights to




207. Id. at 174.
208. See Lindsay, supra note 107, at 20-23.
209. Standard pledge forms often provide the donor with an option to give anony-
mously. See e.g., The Campaign for Saint Louis University, Pledge Form, SAINT Louis
UNiv., www.slu.edu/-curranwp/processes/Pledge%20Form.pdf (the section titled
"Recognition" includes a box to check for "Please omit my name from donor honor
rolls").
210. See Eason, supra note 137, at 394 (recommending that a charity should be cau-
tious to avoid having one of its buildings named after a scoundrel).
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ise to make the contributions under the pledge form. As a result, it
would seem easier to find a bilateral contract under the typical, modem
fact pattern than under the facts in Allegheny College.
Allegheny College draws a great deal of attention, but other cases
also support the view that charitable naming rights are adequate consid-
eration for an enforceable contract. For example, in Woodmere Academy
v. Steinberg,211 the donor signed a pledge to contribute $375,000, con-
tributed $175,000, and paid no more.21 2 In exchange, the school named
its library after the donor's spouse. In correspondence, the school told
the donor "[y]ou have our unconditional and unqualified assurance that
the [library] will continue to be so [named] as long as it is a part of the
school ... .,,23 When the charity sued to enforce the pledge, the court
stated that the charity "did all that the [donor] expected.., including...
naming [the library] after [the donor's spouse],214 and concluded that the
pledge was enforceable as a unilateral contract.21 5
In Stock v. Augsburg College, the college began a $25 million fund
drive to construct a new building and advertised that "[n]amed gift op-
portunities are numerous.216 The college's director of alumni relations
contacted Elroy Stock and "suggested that [he] donate money to con-
struct the communications wing of the [building] and suggested that the
wing could be named after [Stock]. 21 7 In 1986, a letter from the col-
lege's director confirmed Stock's $500,000 donation and his right to
218name the communications wing. In February 1988, "there was a great
deal of unfavorable publicity about [Stock], 219 and the college's presi-
dent and its board of regents voted not to name the wing after Stock, but
they also voted to keep Stock's $500,000 donation. In 1989, after dis-
cussions with Stock, the college "plac[ed] a plaque at the entrance of the
communications wing stating Stock was a major donor.,221 Thereafter,
Stock attended school functions and made donations ranging from $100
211. Woodmere Acad. v. Steinberg, 385 N.Y.S.2d 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
212. Id. at 550, 551.
213. Id. at 551.
214. Id. at 552.
215. Id.
216. Stock v. Augsburg Coll., No. C1-01-1673, 2002 WL 555944, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 16, 2002).
217. Id. at *1.
218. Id. at *1.
219. Id. at *2 (noting that according to news accounts, Stock "had for years been se-
cretly mailing anonymous letters to families and individuals of mixed race and reli-
gion... denounc[ing] mixed marriages[] [and] profess[ing] a viewpoint based on racial
purity"), quoted in Eason, supra note 137, at 396.
220. Stock, 2002 WL 555944, at *2.
221. Id. at *2.
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to $2,000.222 In 1999, Stock approached the college's new president
about naming the communications wing after him.223 The new president
refused and told Stock not to donate any more money to the college.224
Stock promptly sued, alleging breach of contract and misrepresenta-
tion.225 The court agreed with Stock that there was a contract and con-
cluded that the college breached that contract in 1989 when it completed
the building and failed to name the communications wing after Stock.226
The court rejected the college's argument that Stock made a conditional
gift, saying Stock "intended that his $500,000 donation was in exchange
for [the college's] promise to name the wing after him. His intent was
not... a donation to the general building fund.,227 Nevertheless, the
court held that Stock's breach of contract claim was barred by the statute
of limitations.228 As a result, the court never reached the fascinating is-
sue of damages for breach of a naming rights deal.29
In the Carson's Estate case, a school "embarked upon an ambitious
program" to raise $500,000 for multiple projects including building a
new three-story auditorium and gymnasium to be named the "John F.
Carson Memorial Hall" in honor of the school's founder.230 The sister-
in-law of John F. Carson signed a pledge, stating in part, "I promise to
pay [the sum of $5,000] ... as follows... $2,000 when construction of
the John F. Carson Memorial building is begun and [the] balance at my
convenience within [five] years.231  The school raised only $95,000,
paid $30,000 to a professional fundraiser, and used part of the balance to
improve the existing auditorium and gymnasium.232 The school placed
an inscription over the door reading, "The John Carson Auditorium and
Gymnasium," and the school sued the sister-in-law to collect the $5,000
pledge.3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the school's claim,
stating,
[The school] and the court below treat the [sister-in-law's] subscrip-
tion as if it were an executed gift. It was a contract. There is no ques-
tion at this time that it was a valid contract, and that it was supported
by consideration sufficient to contracts of this sort. Under the con-
222. Id. at *2.
223. Id. at *3.
224. Id. at *3.
225. Id. at *3.
226. Id. at *4.
227. Id. at *7.
228. Id. at *4.
229. Id. at *7.
230. In re Carson Estate, 37 A.2d 488, 489 (Pa. 1944).
231. Id. at 490.
232. Id. at 490.
233. Id. at 490-91.
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tract both [the sister-in-law] and [the school] had mutual obliga-
234tions.
The Carson case is particularly interesting because the naming right
did not publicize the donor, instead, it publicized an in-law.
Also, in Paul & Irene Bogoni Foundation v. St. Bonaventure Uni-
versity,235 the Bogoni Foundation signed a gift commitment document
providing, "We... agree to give ... [$1.5 million] ... for the following
purposes: 'The Paul and Irene Bogoni Library Addition.' ' 236 The Bogo-
nis subsequently pledged an additional $500,000 and contributed $1.1
million, and the university sued to collect the $900,000 balance . 37 The
court concluded the parties entered into a unilateral contract, and the uni-
versity prevailed.2 38
2. Conditional Gift or Contract?
In naming rights situations, courts and commentators sometimes as-
sert that the transaction was really a conditional gift rather than a bilat-
eral or unilateral contract, particularly after the donor has made most or
all of the pledge payments.239 Leading authorities acknowledge the po-
tential difficulty of distinguishing a conditional gift from a contract im-
posing one or more conditions.24 ° Courts may find the conditional gift
label attractive because the remedy is clear if the charity fails to fulfill
the naming rights condition; the charity simply returns the amounts do-
nated, perhaps with interest.
24'
234. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
235. Paul & Irene Bogoni Found. v. St. Bonaventure Univ., No. 102095/08, 2009
WL 6318140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2009) (order granting motion to dismiss).
236. Id. at 4-5 ("We recognize that [St. Bonaventure University] will rely on our
gift in authorizing expenses to be paid in anticipation of the payment of our pledge and in
securing any additional pledges from others.").
237. Id. at 1, 5.
238. Id. at 12, 17-18 (relying on Cohoes Mem'l Hosp. v. Mossey, 25 A.D.2d 476
(N.Y. App. Div. 1966)).
239. See, e.g., Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt
Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Eason, supra note 137, at 405 ("Once
the contribution has been made and the name associated. . .[T]he parties' relationship
with regard to the contribution and enforcement of its terms is typically addressed under
property-based principles.").
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (noting "the distinction... may.. . depend[] on the motives manifested by the par-
ties"); see also Carlisle v. T & R Excavating, 704 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); see
also KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 109.
241. See Vanderbilt, 174 S.W.3d at 114, 119 (increasing the amount Vanderbilt
University must repay "based on the consumer price index published by the [U.S.] Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics"); Eason, supra note 137, at 406.
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The distinction between a contract and a conditional gift is "well il-
lustrated" by Professor Williston's story of the benevolent man and the
tramp: "If a benevolent man says to a tramp,- 'If you go around the
comer to the clothing shop... you may purchase an overcoat on my
credit.' 242 The benevolent man is making a conditional gift, and no con-
tract is formed because "no reasonable person would understand that the
short walk was requested as the consideration for the promise .... 243
Professor Williston stresses that in drawing the line between (i) a
conditional gift and (ii) an enforceable contract supported by considera-
tion, the key decisional exercise is making a reasonable interpretation. 244
Professor Williston describes the decision process as follows:
Although no conclusive test exists for making the determination, an
aid in determining which interpretation of the promise is more rea-
sonable is an inquiry into whether the happening of the condition will
benefit the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference that the happening
was requested as a consideration. On the other hand, if, as in the case
of the tramp suggested above, the happening of the condition not only
will not benefit the promisor but is obviously for the purpose of ena-
bling the promisee to receive a benefit (a gift), the happening of the
event on which the promise is conditional, though brought about by
the promisee in reliance on the promise, will not be interpreted as
consideration. 245
In applying this Williston decision model to charitable pledges, the
donor takes the role of the benevolent man, as the promisor, and the
charity takes the role of the tramp. The inquiry should be whether the
condition, namely the naming rights or other public recognition, is more
(i) in the nature of a benefit to the donor246 or (ii) to allow the charity to
receive the gift.
Focusing on the latter test first, it seems difficult to make a case that
the charity's grant of naming rights was something that had to happen for
the charity to receive the gift. Unlike the tramp needing to go to the
clothing store or another similar establishment o receive the gift of a
242. Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 2006) (quoting 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 112, at 380 (Rev. ed. 1936)).
243. See Pennsy Supply, 895 A.2d at 600.
244. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 7:18, at 417-18 (Thomson West 2008) (4th ed. 1990).
245. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 244, at 415-18, quoted in Fritz v. Fritz, No.
08-1088, 2009 WL 779544, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2009); see also PERILLO, supra
note 9, at 157 (stating that the test is as follows: "[s]elfish benefit to the promisor is an
indication of a contract-making state of mind, whereas if the benefit is merely the [result]
of altruism, a gift-making state of mind may be present").
246. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 157.
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coat, the charity could accept the donor's cash or property regardless of
whether the condition- specifically the granting of the naming rights-
occurs. The charity would enjoy the gift whether it is anonymous, or it
comes with naming rights.247
Under the first test, Professor Williston calls for an analysis of any
benefit to the promisor.248 This precise matter is addressed in a seminal
case of contract law. In Allegheny College, Justice Cardozo made a ra-
ther direct response regarding naming rights and those who choose to
give postmortem: "The longing for posthumous remembrance is an emo-
tion not so weak as to justify us in saying that its gratification is a negli-
gible good.,
249
An even stronger case can be made that those who give during their
lifetime benefit from charitable publicity. As discussed in Part III.A.1
supra, the donor's benefits may include (i) a monetary payment if the
charity tries to renege on the naming rights; (ii) publicity; (iii) a reputa-
tion for wealth, generosity, and power; and perhaps (iv) inclusion on the
charity's board of directors or committees and the associated opportunity
to do business with high-net worth individuals and their affiliated busi-
ness enterprises.
In searching for consideration, Professor Williston focuses on
whether the promisor, the donor, receives a benefit, but it should also be
relevant whether the promisee, the charity, incurs a non-trivial legal det-
riment.250 Hamer v. Sidway251 established that an agreement to do what
the law does not require, such as refraining from smoking or drinking
liquor, can be sufficient consideration for a bilateral contract.252 In a
naming rights transaction, the charity typically agrees either to inscribe
an object with the donor's name or commission, mount, and preserve a
plaque with the donor's name on its property. As a charity is not legally
bound to take any of these actions, one could technically say the charity
always incurs a detriment. Nevertheless, in keeping with Professor Wil-
liston's reasonable-interpretation model, it seems appropriate to inquire
whether the legal detriment is merely trivial. In some situations the an-
swer probably would be no.
247. Perhaps an advocate of the conditional gift theory would argue that the naming
rights enable the charity to receive other benefits, namely other gifts, from other donors
who tend to follow the herd mentality.
248. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 244, at 415-18.
249. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y.
1927).
250. See Pennys Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp of Pa., 895 A.2d 595, 602
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (emphasizing that the promisee incurred a detriment by collecting
materials, even though the promisee paid nothing for the material).
251. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
252. Id. at 544-45, 551.
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Some charities have found perpetual naming rights to be a signifi-
cant burden, for example, when the charity must raise funds to renovate
the named property. Again, Lincoln Center paid $15 million, plus bonus
recognition, for the Fisher family to relinquish their perpetual naming
rights over a philharmonic hall needing renovation.253 Only after buying
off the Fisher family for $15 million could Lincoln Center obtain a $100
million donation from David Geffen to pay for the renovation.5 Lin-
coln Center granted naming rights to Mr. Geffen for the renovated facili-
ty in perpetuity.25 5 An astute commentator has observed that Lincoln
Center likely will need to negotiate with Mr. Geffen in a few decades
when the philharmonic hall needs another major renovation.
25 6
Also, the charity loses the opportunity to sell the naming rights to
another donor. For example, Wake Forest University advertises that a
donor can acquire the naming rights to the primary practice tee at its
campus golf course with a $250,000 donation.257 If a donor pledges
$250,000 and accepts the naming rights, this exchange forecloses Wake
Forest from selling the naming rights to another potential donor. In con-
trast, if the original donor donates $250,000 anonymously, then Wake
Forest University can dangle the primary practice tee naming rights as a
benefit to the next potential quarter-million dollar donor. In addition,
naming can be a significant burden for the charity if the donor subse-
quently acquires a reputation as a scoundrel.258 Examples include Dennis
Kozlowski, Ivan Boesky, and others. 9
In contrast, the charity's legal detriment from granting naming
rights may be trivial for a charitable gift establishing a scholarship fund
253. See supra note 165, and accompanying text.
254. David Ng, Geffen in a Giving Mood, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2015, at 2, 2015
WLNR 6606472.
255. Id. (stating that the interior renovation of the philharmonic hall is expected to
cost $500 million, and Mr. Geffen donated $100 million); Robin Pogrebin, How David
Geffen s $100 Million Lincoln Center Gift Came Together, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/arts/music/how-david-geffens-1 00-million-lincoln-
center-gift-came-together.html (reporting that some question whether Geffen's gift "war-
rant[s] the renaming of such a prominent building, given that it represents just 20 percent
of the projected renovation cost," and some question granting the naming rights in perpe-
tuity because "[t]his will not be the last renovation of Avery Fisher Hall, and when you
give rights in perpetuity you make it very challenging to find the money that will be
needed 20, 30, 40, 50 years from now").
256. Pogrebin, supra note 255.
257. See Lindsay, supra note 107, at 22.
258. See Eason, supra note 137, at 394 (discussing the "spate of corporate malfea-
sants who, though charitably inclined, are alleged or proven to have engaged in clearly
reprehensible conduct as judged by the standards of the day").
259. Id. at 394, 397 (discussing Kozlowski and others); Alison Leigh Cowan, Ac-
counting Plan Irks Non-profits, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 1, 1990, at 4, 1990 WLNR
4309040 (discussing Ivan Boesky's promise to donate $1.5 million to Princeton Universi-
ty).
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or a professorship at a school. As long as there are students not receiving
a scholarship and faculty members not supported by a separate fund, in
general, there is no opportunity cost to granting naming rights in connec-
tion with these funds. Nevertheless, in some situations there could be
added administrative costs that may make the legal detriment more than
trivial with such gifts. For example, if the donor is entitled to other
rights, such as having a portrait hanging in a prominent location, having
his or her name publicized in the charity's newsletter and website every
time a scholarship is awarded, or being entitled to special arrangements
at the annual awards ceremony or banquet to publicize the donor, then
the legal detriment may be more than trivial.
A dispute between Vanderbilt University and the Daughters of the
Confederacy over naming rights for a dormitory highlights potential dif-
ficulties with distinguishing contracts from conditional gifts. 260 Ignoring
various name changes and mergers, the Tennessee Division of the United
Daughters of the Confederacy made a $50,000 donation in 1933 to fund
the construction of a dormitory on Vanderbilt University's campus.26'
The pledge documents were titled as "contracts,',262 and among other
conditions, the documents required the school to place an inscription on
the building naming it "Confederate Memorial Hall. 263 In 2002, Van-
derbilt University announced that it would remove the inscription,
change the dormitory's name to "Memorial Hall," and retain a plaque
explaining the history of the naming of the building.2 64 In characterizing
the arrangement between Vanderbilt University and the Daughters of the
Confederacy, the Tennessee Court of Appeals gave an unsatisfactory rea-
son for concluding there was no contract, merely stating "Although all
three agreements use the word 'contract,' they do not purport to establish
a typical commercial arrangement in which one party provides certain
goods and services in return for a sum to be paid by the other party.
265
This rationale overlooks many cases, including Hamer v. Sidway and Al-
legheny College, in which courts have found a contract despite the ab-
sence of a commercial transaction.66 The Tennessee court then focused
260. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
174 S.W.3d 98, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
261. Id. at 104.
262. Id. at 112 (stating that "all three agreements use the word 'contract"').
263. Id. at 105.
264. Id. at 107-108 (explaining that "Vanderbilt has changed its maps, website, and
correspondence to reflect the building's new name of 'Memorial Hall' .. . [but] has not
yet removed the name 'Confederate Memorial Hall' from the pediment of the front of the
building but has indicated its unequivocal intention to do so").
265. Id. at 112.
266. See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 544-45, 551 (N.Y. 1891); see supra
notes 187-207 and accompanying text (discussing Allegheny College).
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on whether the relationship was (i) a conditional gift or (ii) a trust.267
The court found no intent to create a trust268 and concluded that the
Daughters of the Confederacy made a conditional gift. 26 9 Because Van-
derbilt failed to satisfy a condition of the gift, the court concluded that
Vanderbilt must return the amount of the gift to the Daughters of the
Confederacy, plus interest based on the increase in the U.S. Consumer
Price Index.27°
3. Different Fact Patterns, Contracts, and Public Recognition
Whether a particular pledge is an enforceable contract will depend
on the facts, and the facts involved with naming rights and other public
recognition opportunities can vary significantly. When a charity names a
building, the lobby, the atrium, or other significant structural element in
perpetuity, for the life of the structural element, or for a long period of
time, the argument hat the donor has received a benefit will be stronger.
There certainly can be wide variations in these arrangements. For exam-
ple, if the donor simultaneously negotiates that the charity must display a
large portrait of the donor in a prominent area; must use the donor's
name when referring to the building on all letterhead, business cards,
phone listings, signage, and on all pages of the organization's website;
and must state the donor's name when answering the phone, these factors
would all indicate a greater donor benefit.
In contrast, as the public recognition becomes less prominent and
more transitory, the case for consideration weakens. Thus, if the donor's
name merely appears on a donor wall along with dozens of other names,
or if it is on a brick among hundreds of other inscribed bricks, or in the
"honor roll" section of the charity's quarterly newsletter along with hun-
dreds of other donor names, the case becomes stronger that any benefit is
trivial and the parties did not intend for the public recognition to be con-
sideration for the contributions. But even in the honor roll-newsletter
situation, if a donation qualifies for a high rank occupied only by a
wealthy and generous elite-perhaps the "President's Circle" -the case
for finding consideration is stronger.
Also, in particular circumstances it might be argued that the naming
right or other public recognition was not bargained for or did not induce
the donor to pledge. The charity might insist that the donor receive the
267. Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
174 S.W.3d 98, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
268. Id. (explaining that "[t]he mere expression of a donative intent, or a statement
of the purpose for which a gift is given, does not constitute an expression of trust intent").
269. Id.
270. Id. at 119.
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public recognition; the charity may provide the public recognition as a
way to say "Thank You" to its donors; or the parties simply may consid-
er it customary, with the donor feeling totally indifferent about the public
recognition, and the charity providing it merely as a matter of standard
procedure. Often charities seek to justify granting public recognition
based on the "herd mentality" or the "bandwagon effect"-if we publi-
cize more donors, others may feel that giving to the campaign is the
norm and want to join the herd. One charity in its standard pledge form
even highlights this potential when asking if the donor wishes to remain
anonymous: "The gift may be publicly acknowledged to encourage the
support of others."'271 There certainly can be situations when the naming
likely provides no benefit to the donor but provides substantial benefits
to the charity's cause, such as in the case of the Arnold Palmer Prostate
Cancer Center or the Betty Ford Alcoholism Clinic.272
Other interesting issues arise if the donor wishes the charity to pub-
licly recognize someone else in connection with the charitable gift. If the
donor chooses to publicize the family surname, the arrangement arguably
benefits the donor plus all members of the donor's family who share the
surname. An arrangement that provides consideration to a third party
can be a contract.273 Nevertheless, if the third party is totally unrelated to
the donor, the consideration argument becomes much more tenuous. For
example, a donor may contribute the ask amount necessary for naming
rights over a professorship at her alma mater, but the donor might direct
that the school name the professorship after a former teacher at the
school.
4. Enforcing with Normal Promissory Estoppel
The promissory estoppel doctrine grew out of dissatisfaction with
the consideration requirement274 and can be seen as fundamentally at
odds with contract law.275 Reportedly, Professor Williston declared the
new doctrine after finding a series of cases in which courts enforced a
271. The Campaign for Saint Louis University Pledge Form, supra note 209 (under
"Recognition" one of the optional boxes to check is "This gift may be publicly acknowl-
edged to encourage the support of others").
272. See Arnold Palmer Honored by Indian Wells, DESERT SUN (PALM SPRINGS,
CA), Mar. 11, 2012, 2012 WLNR 5244186; Margery Egan, Candid Betty Broke Barriers,
Won OurHearts, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 3,2007, at 6,2007 WLNR 113256.
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The
performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other person.").
274. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 218 ("[I]n its original formulation, it was a sub-
stitute for.., consideration...."); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 80
(1995) (originally published in 1974); KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 210.
275. GILMORE, supra note 274, at 79 (arguing that the "promissory estoppel princi-
ple. . . has, in effect, swallowed up the bargain principle...").
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promise even though the consideration requirement was not satisfied, and
then identifying the common circumstances in those cases.276 Promisso-
ry estoppel is an extremely flexible doctrine. Cases hold that the detri-
mental reliance element is a question of fact for the jury, that the injus-
tice element is a question of law,277 and that equitable principles apply.278
The three elements of a promissory estoppel cause of action reflect its
flexibility: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.279  At its core,
"promissory estoppel provides an additional tool for courts to reach what
they consider to be equitable decisions.28°
In the case of a pledge that is not substantial in amount, the charity
could have difficulty satisfying any of the three elements of the promis-
sory estoppel doctrine. For example, the "injustice" element poses diffi-
culties because the charity did not earn the gift, and the proposed donor
has not profited from the transaction. Also, the reliance element fre-
quently depends on the promisee showing a "definite and substantial
change of position which would not have occurred if the promise had not
been made."28' It may be difficult for a charity to show that it acted rea-
sonably if it substantially changed its position based on a pledge that was
not substantial in amount.
Nevertheless, promissory estoppel can help charities enforce truly
significant pledges. For example, in King v. Trustees of Boston Universi-
ty, 282 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. deposited many of his personal papers
with the library of Boston University, one of his former schools.283 Bos-
ton University paid nothing for the papers.284 The King estate suedBos-
ton University for conversion,285 arguing that Dr. King's estate was the
rightful owner of the papers in the University's special collection sec-
286tion.
276. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 218.
277. See Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 883 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) ("We note a seeming contradiction between, on one hand, cases holding that the
injustice prong... is a question of law, and on the other hand, [a case], holding that...
reliance ... is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.").
278. People v. Castillo, 230 P.3d 1132, 1139 (Cal. 2010).
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
280. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 211.
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(emphasis added).
282. King v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. 1995).
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The relationship between the parties was difficult to classify as each
side had taken many steps, and there were several items of correspond-
ence regarding the collection and its display at the Boston University li-
brary.287 At trial, the jury considered theories of contract, charitable
pledge, statute of limitations, and laches.288 The jury concluded that Dr.
King's promise was "enforceable as a charitable pledge supported by
consideration or reliance,,289 but "the jury also determined that [Dr.
King's] letter promising the papers was not a contract.,290 On appeal, the
court emphasized that Boston University held a convocation in Dr.
King's honor to commemorate receipt of the papers,291 indexed the pa-
pers, "made the papers available to researchers, and provided trained
staff to care for the papers and assist researchers.,292 The appeals court
affirmed the trial court, stating that the case was properly submitted to
the jury and that Dr. King's letter to Boston University about the collec-
tion could be read to contain a promise "supported by consideration or
reliance.293
Charities may find promissory estoppel useful for substantial pledg-
es without naming rights when the charity can show that it would not
have proceeded with a current or completed building or other project
without the pledge. However, the doctrine would not be helpful for
smaller pledges that a charity could replace with reasonable efforts.
B. Second Prong: Enforcing Donor Expectations
As discussed above, in the modem fundraising era, charities likely
can enforce many substantial pledges with no special rules. They can en-
force using the same contract and promissory estoppel principles as other
promisees. However, this Article acknowledges that charitable pledges
are special transactions that merit a special second prong to aid enforce-
ment for three reasons. First, charities depend on pledges to fund build-
ing projects and other long-term endeavors, and some level of certainty is
appropriate if charities act responsibly. Second, charities should not face
the risk vividly illustrated by the famous case of Dougherty v. Salt,
294
namely that a promisor will vigorously proclaim his or her commitment
to be legally bound to make a gift and then escape liability because there
287. Id. at 1201.
288. Id. at 1198.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1203 ("Dr. King spoke at the convocation.").
292. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1203.
293. Id. at 1198.
294. Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919); see supra notes 44-51 and ac-
companying text (discussing Salt v. Dougherty).
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is no consideration. Arguably, this risk should be eliminated because
carrying out the expectations of the parties is a core principle of jus-
tice,295 and freedom of contract should prevail as long as the parties'
agreement does not violate public policy. 296 Third, in the absence of a
special rule, charities would not have an economic incentive to clarify
pledge forms and other documents. A proposal that encourages transpar-
ency on pledge forms and other documents will allow charities, donors,
directors, and courts to act more respectably in these situations.
Accordingly, this Article proposes a second prong, a special rule.
Under this second prong, a charity can enforce a pledge if it can prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the donor intended to be legally
bound. Under this prong, a charity must not simply prove that the donor
intended to make the pledge payments; the charity must prove the donor
intended to be legally bound.
Some existing legal authorities can help make this intent-based sec-
ond prong work fairly and with reasonable certainty. For example, two
cases demonstrate a mere expression of present intent to do something,
rather than a manifestation of intent to be contractually bound. In Peters
v. Bowen,297 a developer signed a declaration that he intended to pave all
the streets in a subdivision, and the court held this was an unenforceable
statement of intent.298 Also, in Pappas v. Hauser,299 the court held that
statements in a written pledge like "I intend to pay" and "I intend to sub-
scribe" were mere expressions of intent to perform and were not legally
enforceable.3 °° Similarly, the mere use of the words "pledge" or "prom-
ise" should not establish that the donor intends to be legally bound. "The
label 'pledge' is not self-defining; [a] pledge can be binding or nonbind-
295. See Brooke Adele Marshall, Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract, 13
MELB. J. INT'L L. 505, 508 (2012) ("There is but one basic policy, namely protection of
the expectations of the parties.") (citations omitted); Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Cir-
cumstances andIntent, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 479 (2008) ("[P]romulgating the 'intent
of the parties' is generally agreed to be one of the primary objectives of contract law...
."). Specifically in regards to charitable pledges, one court has stated, "A primary con-
cern in enforcing charitable subscriptions, as with enforcement of other gratuitous trans-
fers such as gifts and trusts, is ascertaining the intention[s] of the donor. .. . If donative
intent is sufficiently clear, we [should] give effect to that intent to the extent possible
without abandoning basic.., principles." King, 647 N.E.2d at 1200-01.
296. See Swavely v. Freeway Ford Truck Sales, 700 N.E.2d 181, 187 (I11. App. Ct.
1998) (concluding that because public policy strongly favors freedom to contract, courts
should refuse enforcement only if the contract is clearly contrary to public policy), cited
with approval in KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 648.
297. Peters v. Bowen, 631 So.2d 629 (La. Ct. App. 1953).
298. Id. at 631
299. Pappas v. Hauser, 197 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1972); see also Pappas v. Bever,
219 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1974) (interpreting a pledge form with the same language).
300. Bever, 219 N.W.2d at 721, 722.
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ing.' '30  Also, a "promise" to make a gift in the future generally is not
enforceable.3 °2
In determining whether the donor intended to be legally bound, it
would not be necessary for the charity to prove what the donor truly be-
lieved-the donor's subjective intent. Historically, such an approach has
been rejected0 3 because it is too difficult to prove subjective intent.30 4
Judge Learned Hand stated, "[a] contract has, strictly speaking, nothing
to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties,' 305 and his re-
lated maxim was that it does not matter if 20 bishops are prepared to tes-
tify about what one side truly believes.30 6 Instead, a party's intent would
be established by objective manifestations, such as the language in the
pledge form and the party's actions. Under this objective approach, a
court interprets a party's words and actions as a reasonable person,30 7
"understand[ing] ... words according to the usage of [a] normal speaker
of English under the circumstances."30 8
This Article's proposal does not anticipate that the pledge form
would need to contain any exact formulation of terms, so-called "magic
words." Language in a pledge form such as, or similar to, "shall be le-
gally bound," "shall be legally enforceable," or "shall be binding on the
donor's estate, heirs, beneficiaries, and assignees," would each be strong
evidence of the donor's intent to be legally bound. Also relevant would
be the presence, or absence, of certain clauses typically included in
commercial or other legally binding contracts, such as forum selection
clauses, consent to jurisdiction or venue clauses, clauses requiring the
donor to pay interest plus attorneys' fees if a pledge payment is late, or
clauses permitting the charity to assign its rights to payment to a profes-
sional debt collection agency. These enforcement and collection clauses
would each indicate the parties intended the pledge to be legally binding.
301. ALI DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at § 490, cmt. a.
302. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (not enforceable as a contract);
see supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (not enforceable under promissory estop-
pel unless the plaintiff proves all three elements).
303. See PERILLO, supra note 9, at 24 ("[T]he mental intentions of the parties are ir-
relevant."); Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952) (stating
that a party's "claimed intent is immaterial, where it has agreed in writing to a clearly
expressed and unambiguous intent to the contrary.").
304. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 419 (1899), quoted in KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 41.
305. Ray, 93 A.2d at 278 (quoting Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F.
289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
306. Id.
307. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 24; KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 41 (concluding
that "one is ordinarily bound... not by her 'secret intent' ... but by the reasonable inter-
pretation of her words and actions").
308. Holmes, supra note 304, at 419, quoted in KNAPP ET AL., supra note 26, at 41.
[Vol. 120:2
CHARITABLE PLEDGES: CONTRACTS OF CONFUSION
C. Comparison with ALI Proposals
The ALI has made three separate proposals to help charities en-
force pledges. First, after Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) sets
out the normal elements for a promissory estoppel cause of action, a
comment provides that "reliance need not be of a substantial character in
charitable [pledge] cases.,30 9 This ALI first proposal would be mooted if
a court follows the ALI's more sweeping second proposal.
In the more sweeping second proposal, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 90(2)310 would eliminate one of the three elements. It states
that "[a] charitable [pledge] is binding under [promissory estoppel] with-
out proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.'3 1' While this
would eliminate the second element, it may complicate the analysis un-
der the first and third elements. Under the first element, the promisee
(the charity) must prove "[a] promise which the promisor [the donor]
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance.31 2 Under the
language, the donor still must foresee that the charity will rely,313 but
does that make sense if § 90(2) makes it irrelevant whether the charity
actually relies? Also, the third element still requires the promisee (the
charity) to prove "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise,,314 so is it now irrelevant whether the charity actually relied on
a pledge when a court makes this injustice determination? Perhaps under
the ALI proposal a charity can bolster its "injustice" argument if it
proves it relied to its detriment, but the absence of such evidence should
not prejudice the charity's injustice argument.
While a strict reading of § 90(2) merely eliminates one element
from the promissory estoppel test, the related reporter's note suggests a
more fundamental change in approach. It states, "[section 90(2)] treat[s]
charitable [pledges] as a sui generis category requiring neither considera-
tion nor reliance."3 5 Thus, although not expressly stated in § 90(2), the
ALl proposal suggests eliminating any contractual analysis and simply
using the artificial rules of proposed § 90(2).
In contrast to the § 90(2) approach, this Article's proposal encour-
ages courts initially to apply the same normal contract and promissory
estoppel rules to charities as customarily applied to all other situations.
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1), cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
310. Id. § 90(2).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See Budig et al., supra note 9, at 67 (paraphrasing § 90(1) with the second ele-
ment removed).
314. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
315. Id. § 90, cmt. f (reporter's note).
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
This Article's proposal only deviates from normal rules if necessary to
allow charities to enforce otherwise unenforceable pledges when clear
and convincing evidence proves the donor intended to be bound.
A leading commentator summarizes the ALI's apparent policy ra-
tionale for the pro-charity approach in § 90(2), as follows:
Our society depends on private charity ... [charities] rely from year
to year on the likely performance in the aggregate of the [pledges]
they receive, and incur substantial contractual and other obligations
in reliance on those promises; therefore the law should enforce all
such promises, despite the difficulty of showing that any particular
promise produced substantial reliance or of arguing that injustice
would result if that promise alone were to go unperformed.
316
This Article's proposal is not as deferential to charities. While our
society depends on well-managed homeless shelters, food pantries, and
some other charities, the level of dependence is not great for charities
that fund the lavish lifestyles of their executives, incur excessive admin-
istrative expenses, or cater to the needs of the wealthy.1 7 Also, this Arti-
cle's proposal does not adopt the theory that the law should enforce all
such promises; after all, promises in other situations are enforced only if
the contract law or promissory estoppel tests are satisfied.
The third proposal originating with the ALI, 318 a Discussion Draft
on the Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, discusses many
aspects of the enforceability of charitable pledges.31 9 While the Discus-
sion Draft does not directly propose a new rule about the enforceability
of charitable pledges,320 it seems to do so indirectly in discussing when
charities should sue donors to collect unpaid pledges. The Discussion
Draft states, "[a] charity may seek to recover from a donor who fails to
fulfill a material pledge that the parties intended to be binding,'3 21 and
"[a] donor who makes a promise in writing that declares intent of en-
forceability has made a binding pledge.322 While the focus on donor in-
316. Charles L. Knapp, Reliance on the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 60 (1981) (emphasis added).
317. See supra notes 4 and 6 an accompanying text.
318. Because the third proposal was part of a Discussion Draft, it may not be appro-
priate to describe it as an ALI proposal.
319. See ALl DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at, § 490(b).
320. See id. (not indicating when a pledge will be binding, but perhaps suggesting a
limitation on damages in stating,"[t]he court will enforce a binding pledge to the extent
enforcement would be fair under the circumstances"); id. at illus. 2 (stating that § 490(b)
"provides that the charity's recovery on a binding pledge is limited to what justice re-
quires.").
321. Id. § 490(a) (emphasis added). The Discussion Draft does not describe when a
pledge is material.
322. Id. § 490 cmt. b.
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tent to be bound is consistent with this Article's proposal, the Discussion
Draft provides the following series of presumptions about donor intent
that would greatly favor charities:
[A] donor.., is presumed to intend that an oral promise or an am-
biguous written instrument is binding in any of the following circum-
stances-
(1) The donor has partially performed the pledge;
(2) At the time of the pledge or as a result thereof, the donor served
on the governing board or as an officer of the charity;
(3) The charity reasonably relied to its detriment on the donor's
promise; or
(4) The promise induced one or more others to give to the charity, or
counted towards a matching gift.
323
Although this Article's proposal also stresses the importance of a
donor's intent to be bound, it rejects creation of presumptions in these
four circumstances. First, concerning part performance, the view that
one pledge payment automatically means the donor intends to make all
the pledge payments will trick many donors. A donor might make an ini-
tial payment when submitting the pledge form or within a short time
thereafter. The first pledge payment evidences a favorable impression
about the charity at that time, but it should not automatically mean the
donor intended the entire multi-year pledge to be a legally binding debt.
When making the first pledge payment, the donor may be merely ex-
pressing his or her current intention, rather than making a promise to be
legally bound to make all the payments in future years.3 24 In considering
a charity's argument that a pledge was automatically binding because the
donor made part payment, the Iowa Supreme Court stated, "This is a
bootstrap argument. The mere fact a person carries out in part what he
said he intended to do does not convert his statement of intention into a
promise.325
On the second presumption, a donor who is a director or officer of
the charity has a greater connection with the charity, but this does not
necessarily justify a presumption that the donor intends a pledge to be
legally binding. Instead, the donor may consider the pledge a mere
statement of present intent.
323. Id. § 490(c).
324. See supra notes 296-302 and accompanying text (discussing legal authorities
for the position that a statement of future intent is not legally binding).
325. ALI Draft Principles, supra note 9, at § 490, reporter's note 5 (quoting Pappas
v. Bever, 219 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Iowa 1974)).
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The third presumption, arising when the charity reasonably relied to
its detriment on the donor's promise, certainly focuses on a key element
that may help make the pledge enforceable under normal promissory es-
toppel analysis. However, if the other two normal promissory estoppel
elements are not met, then perhaps the pledge should not be enforced.
For example, if the justice element is not met, perhaps in part because the
charity never told the donor that the pledge was legally enforceable, then
it may be inappropriate to create a presumption that the donor intended
the pledge to be binding.
The fourth presumption has two parts. The more disturbing pre-
sumption arises if the pledge counts toward a matching gift. Standard
pledge forms almost always contain a box or line encouraging the donor
to tell the charity whether the donor's employer has a matching gift pro-
gram. The fact that the donor takes the time to provide this small bit of
information should not create a presumption that the donor intends to be
bound to make all the pledge payments in the same manner as if the do-
nor was signing a promissory note to cover a bona fide debt. The donor
may only intend that the employer match the contributions actually made
by the donor. In regards to the other presumption, which arises if the do-
nor's pledge induced one or more other donors to give, it is unclear why
the action of another donor would indicate something about the donor's
intent. Also, this presumption could place the donor at a great disad-
vantage if one other donor is willing to testify for the benefit of the chari-
ty that he or she contributed because of the donor's pledge. What evi-
dence to rebut the other donor's testimony about motive is likely to
prevail? How would the donor obtain that rebuttal evidence about the
other donor? Thus, this Article does not endorse any of the four ALI
Discussion Draft presumptions about donor intent.
D. Ripples: Estate Tax, Bankruptcy, Accounting, and Old Documents
This Article proposes changing the rules for when charitable pledg-
es are legally binding, and such a change would have consequences in
other fields.
1. Federal Estate Tax.
A decedent's estate can only claim a federal estate tax deduction for
the amount of a pledge paid after the donor's death if the pledge was en-
forceable under applicable state law.326 For 2015, the federal estate tax
326. See Estate of Levin v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1951, 1953 (1995); see also
I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) (2012) (allowing a deduction from the gross estate for "claims...
allowable [under state law]"); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(a)(1) (1958) (allowing a deduction
[Vol. 120:2
CHARITABLE PLEDGES: CONTRACTS OF CONFUSION
applies to decedents with a gross estate in excess of $5,430,000.32' Thus,
a wealthy donor's estate may be more careful when honoring a pledge.
Levin v. Commissioner328 demonstrates the worst case scenario
which began with a birthday bash and ended with misfortune for the fam-
ily finances. Jack Levin invited friends, family, and representatives of
twenty charities to attend his ninetieth birthday party at which he "an-
nounced... he would establish a $10,000 charitable remainder annuity
trust for each charity represented at the party . . ,329 Jack Levin died
before establishing the charitable trusts and the personal representative of
his estate honored the pledges totaling $200,000, but the IRS challenged
the related estate tax deduction.30 The U.S. Tax Court concluded that
the Levin estate could not deduct the $200,000 paid on the pledges be-
cause the pledges were not enforceable under Florida law.33 1 This in-
creased the family's estate tax burden by $75,272.
The personal representative of an estate could avoid this risk by
waiting for the charity to sue to enforce the pledge and also waiting for
the state court to decide if the pledge was enforceable. Alternatively, the
personal representative could seek a private ruling from the IRS on




If a donor is bankrupt, whether the charity has an enforceable claim
in bankruptcy for the amount of the bankrupt debtor's unpaid pledge de-
pends on state law. Morton Shoe Company pledged $20,000 to the
Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston and then filed bank-
ruptcy.333 The corporation's pledge card stated, "the subscription is in
if the claim "represent[s] a personal obligation of the decedent existing at the time of the
decedent's death").
327. See I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) (2012) (setting the "basic exclusion amount" at $5 mil-
lion, adjusted for inflation in $10,000 increments); see also Rev. Proc. 2014-61, I.R.B.
2014-47, § 3.33 (announcing the basic exclusion amount for decedent's dying in 2015).
328. Estate of Levin v. Comm'r., 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1951 (1995).
329.Id. at 1951.
330. Id. at 1951-52.
331. Id. at 1953 (stating that "[u]nder Florida law, a promise to contribute to a [char-
ity] ... is enforceable... if the promisor makes a promise which the promisor reasonably
expects to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character by the promisee" (citing
Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So.2d 484, 486-87 (Fla. 1974))); see also Ar-
rowsmith v. Mercantile Safe-Deposit & Trust Co., 545 A.2d 674, 683-685 (Md. 1988)
(finding no estate tax deduction allowed because the charitable pledge would not be en-
forceable under Maryland law).
332. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-18-031, 1997 WL 217758 (May 2, 1997) (explain-
ing a favorable advance ruling from the IRS for a Florida taxpayer was honored).
333. In re Morton Shoe, Inc., 40 B.R. 948, 949 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
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consideration of the pledges of others.334 The charity submitted a claim
in bankruptcy court, and the debtor objected.335 The bankruptcy court
stated, "[t]he allowability of claims is to be determined under state
law,' 336 and concluded that, "[t]he pledge document ... clearly indicates
that by accepting the subscription [the charity] agrees to apply the pledge
amounts in accordance with the charitable purposes set forth in its char-
ter. This is sufficient consideration to support the promise.337
Thus, if this Article's proposal would result in certain pledges not
being enforceable under state law, then those charities would not be able
to enforce those pledges in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In 1998, Congress enacted the Religious Liberty and Charitable
Donation Protection Act,338 which protects charities receiving certain
charitable contributions. The Act eliminates arguments that the charity
should have to disgorge contributions because the contributions were
constructive fraudulent transfers made within one year of the donor filing
bankruptcy.339 The donation must consist of cash or a financial instru-
ment to be protected.3 40 The statute does not protect a charity against
claims of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and oes not
protect donations in excess of 15 percent of the donor's gross annual in-
come, unless the contribution was consistent with the donor's prior con-
tribution history.34 1 However, in regard to charitable pledges, the 1998
statute apparently provides no special protection. A commentator states,
"surprisingly Congress did not protect from attack charitable pledges or
the payment of pledges, since the Donation Protection Act does not pre-





336. Id. at 949.
337. Id. at 951. The court also discussed promissory estoppel principles, stating that
the charity "substantially relie[d]," id., in part because "based on the estimated amount of
[pledges], [the charity] borrows money from banks so that it can make immediate distri-
butions to recipients before obtaining the actual pledge amount." Id. at 949.
338. Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998).
339. J. David Forsyth, Singing the Blues I- Bankruptcy, Insolvency, and Financial
Distress of Donors and Contractors, SH042 ALI-ABA 31, 33 (2003).
340. See Id.
341. See Id. at 33-34.
342. Id. at 34.
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3. Accounting.
In 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board343 issued State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 116 (FASB 116). 44 Under
FASB 116, nonprofits must record the total amount of an unconditional
pledge as revenue, and as an asset, on its financial statements in the year
the charity receives notification of the pledge, even though payments
may not be received for many years.345 The FASB created these rules for
nonprofits to be similar to "how for-profit[] [enterprises] account for
long-term orders, discounting them for inflation and for doubtful ac-
counts receivable.346  In response to FASB 116, "there has been, and
continues to be, considerable controversy surrounding the timing of the
recording of different types of gifts as income.347
One key component of FASB 116 is the requirement that all uncondi-
tional promises to give (pledges)... be recognized in the year the no-
tification of the pledge is received. This can cause significant fluctu-
ations in the. . . net assets of a [nonprofit]. For example, if [a chari-
charity] receive[s] a [$1 million] award to be paid over the next [five]
years [the charity] would have to record the entire [$1 million] in
year [one]. This would likely cause a large increase in net assets in
year [one], however, as the funds are spent in years [two through
five, the charity] would likely show a decrease in net assets. These
fluctuations can be difficult to properly budget and are often confus-
ing to the readers of [the charity's] financial statements and [IRS]
Form 990.348
343. See Matt Roush, Accounting Rules Add Up to Non Profit Headache, CRAIN'S
DET. Bus., Oct. 21, 1996, 1996 WLNR 1159519 (reporting that the Financial Account-
ing Standards Board is a nongovernmental body appointed by the American Institute of
Public Accountants); see also Cowan, supra note 259, at 4 (stating that the FASB is "an
independent seven-member g oup in Norwalk, [Connecticut] ... created in 1973 to set
policy for [both] for-profit and non-profit corporations... that auditors could use to de-
termine whether to sign off on a client's financial statements").
344. See Shawn H. Miller, Nonprofit Accounting Basics: FAS 116, NONPROFIT Ac-




346. Roush, supra note 343.
347. WILEY NOT-FOR-PROFIT GAAP 2013: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES: CONTRIBUTIONS, PLEDGES, AND NON-
CASH CONTRIBUTIONS 1, http://ifrs.wiley.com/chapters/w9781118363249c90; see also
Dumb Idea: Charity Accounting Suggestions Don 't Add Up, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 5, 1990, at 2J, 1990 WLNR 4282789.
348. Miller, supra note 344 (stating that "[tihe main effect of FASB 116 was to re-
quire that [nonprofits] record all unconditional contributions as revenue when notification
of the contribution is received").
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Unpaid pledge amounts must be recorded if the pledge is uncondi-
tional.349 Thus, if a condition creates a bona fide uncertainty, such as a
requirement that the charity raise a significant amount of other funds, the
pledge is not recorded until the condition is satisfied. On the other hand,
a trivial condition will be disregarded, such as a condition that the non-
profit continue to operate until the due date of the pledge payment.50
"The notification [of the pledge] must be in written form, [and] oral
promises should not be recorded.,351  Revocable gifts are not to be rec-
orded until they become irrevocable. Thus, if a last will and testament
contains a pledge, the pledge would not be recorded on the charity's fi-
nancial statements until the donor's death, when the last will and testa-
ment becomes irrevocable.352 Charities can reduce the amounts recorded
for an "allowance for uncollectible pledges.,353 Apparently this allow-
ance can vary based on the charity's experience and expectations.354
Because this Article's proposal would change the test for enforcea-
bility if adopted in a state, presumably it would be appropriate for a char-
ity in an adopting state to revise its financial accounts. If pledges would
become unenforceable, presumably the charity would reverse the entries
originally recording the amounts.
4. Old Documents.
This Article's proposal would change the rules on pledge enforcea-
bility, so a relevant inquiry is how to deal with old documents or ar-
rangements. The proposal would encourage charities to communicate
with donors regarding enforceability in the pledge forms and otherwise,
but what about those old, ambiguous, or silent arrangements created be-
fore the change but calling for payments after the change? A commenta-
tor lists three cases that vividly demonstrate the potential problem with
pledges under a last will and testament: an 1898 will that did not become
effective until 1976; a 1930 will that did not become effective until 1987;




352. See Policy on Recording Pledges, WESLEYAN UNIV.,
http://www.wesleyan.edu/finance/grants/pledges.html (last visited October 16, 2015).
353. Id.
354. See, e.g., id ("The University books a 10% allowance for uncollectible pledges
on the entire pledge receivable balance. This 10% is calculated on the book value
amount."); see also Todd Wallack, United Way Tweaked Its Financial Reports Account-
ants Question Charity's Methods, S.F. CHRON., (July 20, 2003, 4:00 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/United-Way-tweaked-its-financial-reports-
2602208.php (reporting that " he United Way headquarters... know[s] that about 6 per-
cent of pledges on average are uncollectible").
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1960s.3" In addition to pledges under a will, other pledges often have a
three or five-year duration.
There are at least two potential approaches. If a court changes the
enforceability test as recommended in this Article, the court might de-
clare that the new approach will only apply to pledges entered into, or
substantially modified after, the date the court announces the change.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts used this prospective-only type ap-
proach in Sullivan v. Burkin356 involving a change that impacted how es-
tate planners used trusts.357 Such an approach would address arguments
that the judiciary changed the rules charities reasonably relied upon when
soliciting pledges.
Alternatively, courts could adopt the new approach and apply it
even to old documents. For pledges under decedents' wills, the charities
are still likely to prevail on the clear-and- convincing-evidence-of-intent
prong proposed in this Article358 because wills are solemn documents,
generally requiring the testator-donor to sign in the presence of two
competent witnesses.359 When signing a will foreseeing pledge payments
after death, the donor knew that after death he or she would not be able
to have a change of heart in response to new circumstances or develop-
ments. Thus, the mere fact that the donor anticipated the pledge being
paid after death reflects an intent for the pledge to be legally binding af-
ter death.36°
In regard to other pledges, such as the common three-year or five-
year pledge, the charities may complain if a donor can now successfully
renege under a new test, but it could be argued the charities should have
been honest with their donors when the pledges were made originally. A
charity should not be rewarded for using an ambiguous or silent docu-
ment regarding enforceability or failing to clarify the arrangement if the
donor presented the charity with an ambiguous or silent gift document.
Also, there have been previous signals that charities hould fully docu-
355. Eason, supra note 137, at415 n.152.
356. Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577-78 (Mass. 1984); see also Bongaards
v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 340-42 (Mass. 2003).
357. The change would treat assets of certain types of trusts as part of a decedent's
estate for purposes of calculating a surviving spouse's statutory share when he or she
elects to take against the will of the pre-deceasing spouse. See Bongaards, 793 N.E.2d at
340-42.
358. See supra Part III.B (describing the second prong of this Article's proposal).
359. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ES-
TATES 159-60 (9th ed. 2013); see also ROGER W. ANDERSON & IRA MARK BLOOM,
FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 117-20 (4th ed. 2012).
360. See Trozpek, supra note 2, at 4, 12.
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ment the understanding with a donor.361 For example, in 1978, the Met-
ropolitan Museum of Art asked a New York court to enforce a $1.5 mil-
lion unpaid pledge that "resulted from a casual and informal conversation
between [a deceased Met board member and the president of the muse-
urn].,362 The court enforced the pledge but strongly criticized the chari-
ty.
Gifts to charity should not be treated in a casual manner. . . . There
is no more room for casual estate planning in charitable gift-giving
than there is in any other estate planning device. This warning is is-
sued to donors and charitable donees alike. ... These proceedings
would not have been necessary if the Museum had followed reasona-
bly prudent business methods .... 363
Also, the 2009 ALl Discussion Draft on the Principles of Nonprofit
Organizations stated in regards to "[d]istinguishing between binding and
nonbinding pledges ... . the charity should endeavor to ensure that the
documentation resolves doubts.' 3 4
IV. CONCLUSION: WHY HONESTY IS A BETTER POLICY
When Ebenezer Scrooge seeks to justify prior actions, he asserts
that his former partner, Jacob Marley, was "always a good man of busi-
ness."365 Marley's morally-reformed ghost wrings his hands and force-
fully proclaims that charity, not banking, should have been his primary
business.366 Marley's ghost associates the business of charity with "mer-
cy, forbearance, and benevolence.,367 Likewise, the business of charity
should bring out its actors' best qualities including honesty, transparen-
cy, altruism, and empathy. If any endeavor should allow people to apply
their highest virtues, it should be the business of charity. Unfortunately,
the law on enforcing charitable pledges appears to foster deception, in-
gratitude, uncertainty, and regret, respectively, for four groups participat-
ing in the business of charity.
361. See Budig et al., supra note 9, at 121 n.432 (discussing In re Payson); see also
Carolyn Clark & Jay W. Swanson, Promised Gifts to Museum: Monet in the Bank? PRO-
BATE & PROPERTY, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 12, 12-16.
362. ALl DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at cmt. 6. (quoting In re Payson (Metro-
politan Museum of Art), 180 N.Y.L.J. 14 (July 26, 1978) (N.Y. Surr. Ct. Nassau Co.)).
363. In rePayson, 180 N.Y.L.J. at 14.
364. ALI DRAFT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at cmt. b.
365. CHARLES DICKENS, A Christmas Carol, in A CHRISTMAS CAROL, THE
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First, fundraisers usually3 68 hide the reality that a signed, standard
pledge form is almost always a legally binding obligation.369 Fundraisers
likely have no practical choice but to be sneaky. Because courts enforce
ambiguous and uninformative pledge forms in the great majority of situa-
tions, there is no financial incentive to honestly disclose. Indeed, includ-
ing language about legal enforceability and clauses about collection like-
ly would negatively impact the amount of pledges. Donors would be
slower to pledge, and their enthusiasm and passion may cool in the
course of discussions with attorneys and financial planners.37° If a fund-
raiser is passionate about the charity's mission, we would expect the
fundraiser to promote the charity's financial interests. An experienced
consultant has made a similar observation about the choice between en-
couraging anonymous giving and selling naming rights; a charity that
fails to sell naming opportunities that potentially promote donor self-
aggrandizement jeopardizes its charitable mission.371 Similarly, in the
current legal climate, a charity that tells its potential donors they can ex-
pect to be sued if they miss a pledge payment may jeopardize its charita-
ble mission, especially because other charities are not being forthright
about enforceability.
Second, the charity's directors are in a very difficult position if a
donor misses one or more pledge payments under the current legal ap-
proach. In the absence of legal rules, the directors might want to consid-
er all the facts and circumstances relating to the donor's failure to con-
tribute, such as whether the donor was told in connection with the
original solicitation that the pledge was binding, whether the charity
changed its methods of operations, whether the charity has failed to live
up to its advertising or reputation at the time the pledge was made, and
so forth. Nevertheless, the directors owe a duty to pursue the best finan-
cial interests of the charity,372 and the current legal rules will allow the
charity to collect against the donor even if the charity concealed enforce-
ability and took actions that arguably give the donor good cause to re-
nege.
Third, the donors making charitable pledges might appreciate full
disclosure so that they know the rules. When making the pledge, if the
pledge form was silent or ambiguous on the topic, the donor may have
believed the pledge was a mere statement of intent, and that if circum-
stances changed and the poor could be helped more by the donor giving
368. See supra Part II.A (indicating that ninety-five percent of pledge forms fail to
clearly address enforceability).
369. See supra Part I.B.
370. See supra Part lI.B.
371. BURTON, supra note 137, at xvi-xvii.
372. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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elsewhere, the donor would be free to try to do the most good by reallo-
cating future donations to another charity. Donors, and society in gen-
eral, should be disappointed if charitable dollars cannot do the most good
possible, and tricky charities should not be rewarded for their lack of
transparency.
Fourth, the courts have complained bitterly about the role they play
in the charitable pledge business. Courts say they have committed "legal
heresy373 and created "legal ... fiction.,
374
This Article's empirical evidence indicates that he legal rules fail to
promote honesty, transparency, certainty, and fair dealing in the business
of charity. This Article's proposal seeks to make the charitable pledging
business the sort of activity a reformed Ebenezer Scrooge should pursue.
ADDENDUM:
STANDARD PLEDGE FORMS
Note: The pledge forms were gathered in 2015 by visiting the web-
sites of organizations listed in three U.S. News & World Reports lists
(law schools, hospitals, and children's hospitals). We did not use any
pledge forms that required a representation that we were going to make a
contribution or pledge. We excluded forms that anticipated pledges
through payroll deductions, or that anticipated perpetual contributions
from a credit card. The pledge forms for the institutions listed below are
on file with the author. Any parenthetical notes following an institu-
tion's name indicates a provision in the form that was unusual or indicat-
ed enforceability.
-Arizona State University ("I hereby indicate my intent to make a gift to
ASU")
-University of California at Berkeley ("I will use best efforts to, and ful-
ly intend to, satisfy my pledged commitment")
-Brooklyn Law School
-Case Western University
-Catholic University of America (you can stop a "perpetual gift" at any
time you choose)
373. Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n of Del., 104 A.2d 903, 907 (Del. 1954).
374. Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So.2d 484, 487 (Fla. 1974).
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-Children's Hospital of SW Florida - Capet
-Children's Healthcare of Atlanta Foundation
-Children's Hospital of Wisconsin
-Cincinnati Children's Hospital Colorectal Center
*University of Colorado-Boulder
*University of Denver




-University of Florida-College of Agriculture and Life Sciences
* Georgetown University
*Gonzaga University
-Indiana University Foundation (Indianapolis)
-University of Iowa Foundation ("In consideration of the gifts of others")
-University of Iowa Foundation - Kidsight Excellence Fund ("I hereby
subscribe and agree to pay .... )
-University of Kentucky College of Medicine
-Lewis & Clark College
*University of Miami Agreement of Gift ("the balance shall be a debt of
the donor's estate")
-Museum of Science & Industry (Tampa, FL)
-University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ("Commitment to Caroli-
na")
534 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:2
-University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill - Division of Clinical La-
boratory Science
-Northwestern University
oPepperdine University Women's Swimming and Diving Team Cam-
paign Pledge Commitment 12/1/2009 to 1/31/2010 ("This pledge agree-
ment sets forth the terms and conditions of the underlying commitment
and is intended to be binding on the parties")
-University of Richmond ("I agree to make the contributions listed be-
low... I may elect to accelerate my contributions")
-University of Rochester Medical Center -Caroline Breese Hall MD En-
dowment for Infectious Diseases
-San Francisco State University Aaron Anderson Fund
-Santa Clara University-Pause for Coz Scholarship
-Seattle University
*SMU Second Century Campaign ("It is my intention to fulfill this
commitment with a gift of $_ ")
-South Carolina State University
-University of South Carolina
-St. Jude Children's Research Hospital Sickle Cell Disease Program
-St. Louis University Campaign ("This gift may be publicly acknowl-
edged to encourage the support of others")
-Temple University School of Medicine
-Temple University-Martin Whitaker Jr. Memorial Endowed Scholarship
-University of Tennessee Foundation
*Texas Children's Hospital
*UCLA David Geffen School of Medicine
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-Upstate Medical University Foundation
University of Utah Law School Building Justice Capital Campaign
Pledge Form
-University of Virginia
-University of Virginia Class Reunion Pledge Form
*Villanova 2015 Staff Giving Form
*Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center
-Washington & Lee
-University of Washington ("I confirm my intent to contribute a total
of .... ")
*University of Washington School of Law
*Washington University in St. Louis Law School Class Giving Cam-
paign
-Washington University in St. Louis EMBA 43 Pledge Form
*University of Washington Medical School
*University of Wisconsin
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